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IMPORT UPON DIFFERENTIAL RATES.

PEELIMINABY.

In January, 1882, the undersigned were notified that they

had been selected by the New York Central & Hudson Kiver

Eailroad Company, W. H. Vanderbilt, President ; the New

York, Lake Erie & Western Eailroad Company, H. J. Jewett,

President ; the Pennsylvania Eailroad Company, G. B.

Eoberts, President, and the Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad Com-

pany, John W. Garrett, President, to act as an Advisory Com-

mission upon " the differences in rates that should exist, both

eastwardly and westwardly, upon all classes of freights

between the several terminal Atlantic ports," and to report

upon the same.

I
!'I)

llEPDRT

UPON DIFFERENTIAL RATES.
___

0

...,...._ ___

Accepting the appointment, the undersigned met and organ-

PRELIMINARY.
ized as a Commission, at the City of New York, on February

13, 1882, by designating Mr. Thurman to act as Chairman and

selecting Mr. Thomas C. Moore, of Indianapolis, as Secretary.

On conferring with Mr. Albert Fink, who on that occasion rep-

resented the several railroads named, we were informed that

.., it was not the purpose or desire of the railroad managers to

>^ take part in the proposed inquiry after setting it on foot ; but

^. that they proposed to leave it exclusively in our hands, in the
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expectation, however, that other parties interested in the

problems of railroad transportation would make before us a

full showing of the facts supposed to lave a bearing upon

the question, and that we would then express our opinion,

uninfluenced by the wishes or interests of the railroad com-

panies. The managers informed us, however, that they held

themselves ready to furnish any such information as might

be peculiarly within their knowledge, at any time when we

might call for it.

In January, 1882, the undersigned were notified that they
had been selected by the New.York Central & Hudson River
Railroad Company, W. H. Vanderbilt, P1·esident; the New
York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company, H. J. Jewett,
President;

the

Pennsylvania

Railroad

Company,

G.

B.

Roberts, President, and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Com
pany, John W. Garrett, President, to act as an Advisory Com
mission upon " the differences in rates that should exist, both
eastwardly

and westwardly, upon all classes of

freights

between the several terminal Atlantic ports," and to report
upon the same.
Accepting the appointment, the undersigned met and organ
ized as a Commission, at the City of New York, on February
13, 1882, by designating Mr. Thurman to act as Chairman and
selecting Mr. Thomas C. Moore, of Indianapolis, as Secretary.
On conferring with Mr. Albert Fink, who on that occasion rep
resented the several railroads named, we were informed that
it was not the purpose or desire of the railroad manage1·s to
take part in the proposed inquiry after setting it on foot; but
that they proposed to leave it exclusively in our hands, in the
expectation, however, that other parties interested in the
problems of railroad transportation would make before us a
full showing of the facts supposed to :have a bearing upon
the question, and that we would then express our opinion,
uninfluenced by the wishes or interests of the railroad com
panies.

The managers informed us, however, that they held

themselves ready to furnish any such information

as

might

be peculiarly within their knowledge, at any time when we
might call for it.

Having this understanding of our commission, and desir-

4

ous of acting intelligently and with full information, we

caused circulars to be sent to all the commercial organiza-

tions of the cities of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and

Boston, and to such like organizations in the interior as it was

thought would be inclined to respond, inviting them to ap-

pear before the Commission and present their views ; and

whenever a desire to be heard was expressed by any one of

them, time and place were designated for the purpose.

From the Produce Exchange, the Board of Trade and

Transportation, and the Chamber of Commerce, of the City

of New York, and from the corresponding organizations of

the cities of Philadelphia and Baltimore, letters expressive

of a desire to be heard were received, and public meetings

were accordingly held in those cities, at which the question

referred to us was very fully considered and discussed. For

the purposes of such discussion, we found that in every in-

stance careful and thoughtful preparation had been made,

and the arguments, either in full or in substance, were put in

print for our subsequent review. Statistics were also col-

lected for us, so far as was thought important. Under the

guidance of the commercial bodies, we also visited and in-

spected the railroad terminal facilities, under circumstances
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most favorable to a full understanding of the manner in which

they concerned the general subject.

The leading commercial organizations of St. Louis, Louis-

ville and Toledo also appeared before us at public sittings

held in those cities respectively, and presented their views in

print, supplementing them with oral arguments and explana-

tions.

We were also favored at Philadelphia with discussions by

representatives of the Board of Trade of Newark, New Jer-

sey, and at St. Louis with the views of the Board of Trade of

Indianapolis, presented by one of its members. The Cham-

ber of Commerce of Cincinnati communicated its views to us

in formal resolutions, without deeming it necessary to request

public sittings in that city, and single individuals, not repre-

senting any formal organizations, have also in some cases

Having this understanding of our commission, and desir
ous of acting intelligently and with full information, we
caused circulars to be sent to all the commercial organiza
tions of the cities of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and
Boston, and to such like organizations in the interior as it was
thought would be inclined to respond, inviting them to ap
pear before the Commission and present their views ; and
whenever a desire to be heard was expressed by any one of
them, time and place were designated for the purpose.
From the Produce Exchange, the Board of Trade and
Transportation, and the Chamber of Commerce, of the City
of New York, and from the corresponding organizations of
the cities of Philadelphia and Baltimore, letters expressive
of a desire to be heard were received, and public meetings
were accordingly held in those cities, at which the question
referred to us was very fully considered and discussed.

For

the purposes of such discussion, we found that in every in
stance careful and thoughtful preparation had been made,
and the arguments, either in. full or in substance, were put in
print for our subsequent review.

Statistics were also col

lected for us, so far as was thought important.

Under the

guidance of the commercial bodies, we also visited and in
spected the railroad terminal facilities, under circumstances
most favorable to a full understanding of the maimer in which
they concerned the general subject.
The leading commercial organizations of St. Louis, Louis
ville and Toledo also appeared before us at public sittings
held in those cities respectively, and presented their views in
print, supplementing them with oral arguments and explan a
tions.

We were also favored at Philadelphia with discussions by

representatives of the Board of Trade of Newark, New Jer
sey, and at St. Louis with the views of the Board of Trade of
Indianapolis, presented by one of its members.

The Cham

ber of Commerce of Cincinnati communicated its views to us
in formal resolutions, without deeming it necessary to request
public sittings in that city, and single individuals, not repre
senting any formal organizations, have also in some cases

been heard. We have also sought and obtained information

5

independently wherever we have found it available, and

have made use of the published reports of the railroad com-

panies for that purpose. Our endeavor has been to view the

subject from the standpoints of the various interests con-

cerned, and to reach a conclusion that OA'erlooked the just

claims of no interest and no locality.

THE QUESTION.

The subject referred to us is that commonly spoken of

under the designation of Differential Eates. In the reference,

however, and in the paper which follows, the term is made

use of in a somewhat restricted sense, being applied not to

the differences in rates generally, or as between the several

classes of freight as they are arranged in the tariffs of freight

been heard.

We have also sought and obtained information

independently wherever we have found it available, and
have made use of the published reports of the railroad com
panies for that purpose.

Our endeavor has been to view the

subject from the standpoints of the various interests con
cerned, and to reach a conclusion that overlooked the just
claims of no interest and no locality.

charges, but to the differences in rates.which are made by

THE

the railroad companies as between the several Atlantic sea-

port cities, and the interior points where the freights are taken

up or delivered. It appears that the four railroad companies

mentioned, and which, with the Grand Trunk of Canada, are

commonly called the Trunk Line roads, have generally been

accustomed to make higher charges for the transportation of

freights between New York and Boston, as eastern termini,

and the leading towns of the interior, than between Philadel-
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phia and Baltimore and the like towns ; and that at the present

time they seem to agree in the policy and propriety of mak-

ing these differences. An idea of the extent of the differences

is indicated by the statement that, taking the charges for the

transportation of eastward bound freights from Chicago to

New York as the standard, the charges to Boston are made

the same, and those to Philadelphia two cents, and to Balti-

more three cents per hundred pounds less. On westward

bound freights the differences are not uniform, but are made

higher in the case of those classes of property which are

rated highest in the freight tariffs. As between the seaboard

cities and St. Louis, Cincinnati, Toledo and other Western

towns, the rates are proportioned to the Chicago rate accord-

ing to mileage. This is the existing rule or practice.

QUESTION.

The subject referred to us is that commonly spoken of
under the designation of Differential Rates.

In the reference,

however, and in the paper which follows, the term is made
use of in a somewhat restricted sense, being applied not to
the differences in rates generally, or

as

between the several

classes of freight as they are arranged in the tariffs of freight
charges, but to the differences in rates.which are made by
the railroad companies

as

between the several Atlantic sea

port cities, and the interior points where the freights are taken
up or delivered.

It appears that the four railroad companies

mentioned, and which, with the Grand Trunk of Canada, are
commonly called the Trunk Line roads, have generally been
accustomed to make higher charges for the transportation of
freights between New York and Boston, as eastern termini,
·and the leading towns of the interior, than between Philadel
phia and Baltimore and the like towns ; and that at the present
time they seem to agree in the policy and propriety of mak
ing these differences.

An idea of the extent of the differences

is indicated by the statement that, taking the charges for the
transportation of eastward bound freights from Chicago to
New York as the standard, the charges to Boston are made
the same, and those to Philadelphia two cents, and to Balti
more three cents per hundred pounds less.

On westward

bound freights the differences are not uniform, but are made
higher in the case of those classes of property which are
rated highest in the freight tariffs.

As between the seaboard

cities and St. Louis, Cincinnati, Toledo and other Western
towns, the rates are proportioned to the Chicago rate accord
ing to mileage.

This is the existing rule or practice.

6

6

Whether it is right or proper to make any such discrimina-

tion in the charges for the transportation of property between

the Atlantic cities and the cities of the interior, and if so, to

what extent, is the question that we understand was referred

to us, and nothing more. We, therefore, limit our discussion

to that question, and pass by many subjects of interest in

railroad transportation that were more or less touched upon

in the public discussions which took place in our hearing, but

which can interest us only as private citizens. Whatever

opinions we or any of us may have respecting controverted

questions in railroad policy and railroad management, which

do not fall within the scope of our present inquiry, it would

not become us to intrude them into this discussion.

Whether it is right or proper to make any such discrimina
tion in the charges for the transportation of property between
the Atlantic cities and the cities of the interior, and if so, to
what extent, is the question that we understand was referred
to us, and nothing more.

We, therefore, limit our discussion

to that question, and pass by many subjects of interest in
railroad transportation that were more or less touched upon
in the public discussions which took place in our hearing, but

THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

Although the invitation to us came from the Trunk Line

railroad companies, we have not understood that this was be-

cause the subject was one over which they had rightfully any

exclusive authority. It is, indeed, a subject with which they,

first of all, are called upon to deal, for they and their affiliated

roads enforce the charges which come under consideration,

and establish the differentials if any are established at all.

which can interest us only as private citizens.

Whatever

opinions we or any of us may have respecting controverted
questions in railroad policy and railroad management, which
do not fall within the scope of our present inquiry, it would
not become us to intrude them into this discussion.

But the railroads constitute a single class only of the many
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whose interests may be affected, and it may appear, perhaps,"

that they are not the class most largely concerned. In all the

discussions before us it has been assumed that the people of

Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, and especially

all those who are engaged in the exchange of commodities

with the interior and with foreign countries, are largely in-

terested, and that their prosperity is to some extent involved

in the relative adjustment of rates. The railroads of the in-

terior, which act as feeders to the Trunk Lines, and divide

with them the charges on freights moved between the in-

terior and the seaboard, are also interested to the extent that

the differentials affect their proportion of the charges. We

have found also that the people of the interior consider

their interests to some extent involved in the question; and

they certainly are concerned in having such tariffs of charges

THE

PARTIES

CONCERNED.

Although the invitation to us came from the Trunk Line
railroad companies, we have not understood that this was be
cause the subject was one over which they had rightfully any
exclusive authority. It is, indeed, a subject with which they,
fust of all, are called upon to deal, for they and their affiliated
roads enforce the charges which come under consideration,
and establish the differentials if any are established at all.
But the railroads constitute a single class only of the many
whose interests may be affected, and it may appear, perhaps,·
that they are not the class most largely concerned.

In all the

discussions before us it has been assumed that the people of
Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, and especially
all those who are engaged in the exchange of commodities
with the interior and with foreign countries, are largely in
terested, and that their prosperity is to some extent involved
in the relative adjustment of rates.

The railroads of the in

terior, which act as feeders to the Trunk Lines, and divide·
with them the charges on freights moved between the in
terior and the seaboard, are also interested to the extent that
the differentials affect their proportion of the charges.

We

have found also that the people of the interior consider
their interests to some extent involved in the question; and
they certainly are concerned in having such tariffs of charges

upon the roads over which their traffic is conducted as

7

will give them the advantages of any and all the Atlantic

markets, without subjecting their dealings with any one of

them to unfair conditions or burdens. It is therefore evident

that the question is one of very general interest; and it may

almost be said that the question of relative equality of rates,

as between Chicago and the Atlantic ports, when those be-

tween the other Western towns and the same ports are meas-

ured by them, is one of national rather than of local concern.

THE SITUATION.

Three distinct views of the differential rates were taken

and urged before us, which may be shortly stated as follows :

The New York view, that the differences made in the rates in

favor of Baltimore and Philadelphia were wholly wrong and

should be abrogated; the Baltimore view, that the differen-

tials were right in principle, but if anything too small; the

upon the roads over which their traffi c is conducted as
will give them the advantages of any and all the Atlantic
markets, without subjecting their dealings with a.ny one of
them to unfair conditions or burdens.

It is therefore evident

that the question is one of very general interest ; a.nd it may
almost be said that the question of relative equality of rates,
as between Chicago and the Atlantic ports, when those be

tween the other Wastern towns and the same ports are meas
ured by them, is one of national rather than of local concern.

Philadelphia view, that the differentials should continue, but

THE SITUATION.

that they ought not to discriminate as between Philadelphia

and Baltimore. In the interior we encountered much differ-

ence in opinion, but no views distinctively peculiar.

The discussion was opened at New York, where it seemed

to be assumed that the parties chiefly concerned were the

three cities of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, and

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015020916527
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

that the differentials operated to build up the business of the

two last to the prejudice of that of New York. On this as-

sumption it was then said they were unjust, and that it was

the duty of the New York railroads to force their abrogation.

It was also assumed that two of the Trunk Line railroads were

peculiarly New York roads, whose managers ought to be ex-

pected to labor especially in the New York interest, and to

enter into the rivalries of that city, so far, at least, as might

be necessary to protect the commerce of New York against in-

jury through the more favorable rates which might be offered

by the Philadelphia and Baltimore kroads to the people of

those cities respectively. At Philadelphia a somewhat simi-

lar view was taken of the obligation of the Pennsylvania Eail-

road to protect Philadelphia interests, and at Baltimore a

Three distinct views of the differential rates were ta.ken
and urged before us, which may be shortly stated as follows :
The New York view, that the differences made in the rates in

favor of Baltimore and Philadelphia were wholly wrong a.nd

should be abrogated ; the Baltimore view, that the diff eren
tials were right in principle, but if anything too small ; the
Philadelphia view, that the differentials should continue, but
that they ought not to discriminate as between Philadelphia
and Baltimore.

In the interior we encountered much differ

ence in opinion, but no views distinctively peculiar.
The discussion was opened at New York, where it seemed
to be assumed that the parties chiefly concerned were the
-three cities of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, a.nd
that the differentials operated to build up the business of the
two last to the prejudice of that of New York.

On this as

sumption it was then said they were unjust, and that it was
the duty of the New York railroads to force their abrogation.

It was also assumed that two of the Trunk Line railroads were
peculiarly New York roads, whose managers ought to be ex
pected to labor espe cially in the New York interest, and to
enter into the rivalries of that city, so far, at least, as might
be necessary to protect the commerce of New York against in
jury through the more favorable rates which might be offered
by the Philadelphia and Baltimore ,,roads to the people of
those cities respectively.

At Philadelphia a somewhat simi

lar view was ta.ken of the obligation of the Pennsylvania Rail
road to prote ct Philadelphia interests, and at Baltimore a

8

8

corresponding protection appeared to be looked for at the

hands of the Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad. Thus the several

corresponding protection appeared to be looked for at the

Trunk Line railroads were spoken of as New York, Philadel-

phia and Baltimore roads respectively, and claims of a local

hands of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

nature were made upon them as being such roads.

phia and Baltimore roads respectively, and claims of a local

struck us more forcibly than the fact that the growth of rail-

road business has been such as to take from the several

Trunk Line roads nearly all of purely local character which they

·
formerly possessed. The time appears to have gone by when

the interests of any one of them can be concentrated upon

and bound up indissolubly with the interests of any one city,

so as to constitute it either the dependent or the champion of

that city as against the rest of the Union, or even as against

any other commercial centre of the Union. The arms of

every one of these roads reach out in every direction to em-

brace and gather in the business of the country, and to dis-

tribute impartially according to need and demand. States

and cities have called particular railroads into being, but

they cannot circumscribe their operations, or make exclusive

appropriation of their benefits. Once constructed, they be-

long to a public which pays little regard in business matters
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to State lines, and business reasons, which have general influ-

ence and force, control their operations, in spite of local sym-

pathies or desires. It is true that two of the Trunk Line

railroads—the New York Central & Hudson Eiver, and the

New York, Lake Erie & Western—hereinafter spoken of as the

Central and the Erie respectively—find the largest share of

what is called their through business directed to or origin-

ating at the City of New York, and it may be that their man-

agers desire to bring to that city all the business they can

control. In common parlance, there is certainly nothing

misleading in speaking of these two as New York roads; for

the major part of their interests centre in New York, and

whatever benefits or injures the business of New York, must,

to some extent, benefit or injure them also. But these roads

do not refuse freights to Baltimore, Philadelphia or Boston ;

on the contrary, they enter into competition for them, and

Thus the several

Trunk Line railroads were spoken of as New York, Philadel

Nothing, however, in our investigation of the subject has

nature were made upon them as being such roads.

Nothing, however, in our investigation of the subject has

struck us more forcibly than the fact that the growth of rail

road business has been such as to take from the several

Trunk Line roads nearly all of purely local character which they

formerly possessed.

The time appears to have gone by when

the interests of any one of them can be concentrated upon

and bound up indissolubly with the interests of any one city,

so as to constitute it either the dependent or the champion of

that city as against the rest of the Union, or even as against
any other commercial centre of the Union.

The arms of

every one of these roads reach out in every direction to em

brace and gather in the business of the country, and to dis
tribute impartially according to need and demand.

States
and cities have called particular railroads into being, but

they cannot circumscribe their operations, or make exclusive
appropriation of their benefits.

Once constructed, they be

long to a public which pays little regard in business matters

to State lines, and business reasons, which have general infhi

ence and force, control their operations, in spite of local sym

pathies or desires.

It is true that two of the Trunk Line

railroads-the New York Central & Hudson River, and the

New York, Lake Erie & Western-hereinafter spoken of as the
Central and the Erie respectively-find the largest share of

what is called their through business directed to or origin

ating at the City of New York, and it may be that their man

agers desire to bring to that city all the business they can
control.

In common parlance, there is certainly nothing

misleading in speaking of these two as New York roads; fOl'

the major part of their interests centre in New York, and
whatever benefits or injures the business of New York, must,

to some extent, benefit or injure them also.

But these roads

do not refuse freights to Baltimore, Philadelphia or Boston ;
on the contrary, they enter into competition for them, and

9

9

through. the assistance of affiliated roads, endeavor to make

it for the interest of the people of those cities to avail them-

selves of their facilities in the transportation of goods and

supplies. They thus make themselves part of a system of

competitive roads, which offers to the business community

of every Atlantic seaport a choice of traffic routes and traffic

agencies, and they solicit business on the necessary under-

standing that they shall respect the just rights and claims of

all localities, and not sacrifice to New York the interests

which are confided to them elsewhere.

It is also not misleading to speak of the Baltimore & Ohio

Eailroad as a Baltimore road, for its interests, in the main,

centre in the City of Baltimore ; its bonds and stocks are

supposed to be mainly held or controlled there, and its traffic

is mainly between that city and the interior. But this road,

no more than the New York roads, consents to stand apart

from the railroad system of the country, as a road limiting

its business to a single Atlantic terminus, and declining general

competition. On the contrary, it solicits business at the

seaports to the north of Baltimore; and that its efforts

in that direction have a fair measure of success is evi-

denced by the fact that in the year 1880 it carried of the
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westward bound freight moved by the Trunk Line roads from

New York more than eight per cent., from Philadelphia more

than nine per cent., and from Boston about five per cent.,

and these proportions are fairly representative of the general

run of its traffic. These facts are sufficient to show that

neither the New York roads nor the Baltimore road are so ex-

clusively linked to the business interests of those cities re-

spectively as to be either unable or unwilling to share in or

contribute to the prosperity of rival cities. And it is now

publicly said and seems to be understood that the Baltimore

<fe Ohio is seeking to obtain an independent line into New

York, that it may make its competition at that point still

more active and efficient.

It certainly cannot be claimed, with much appearance of

plausibility, that the Pennsylvania Bailroad is the road of any

particular city. The company which owns it is indeed a Penn-

through the assistance of affiliated roads, endeavor to make

it for the interest of the people of those cities to avail them
selves of their facilities in the transportation of goods and
supplies.

They thus make themselves part of a system of

competitive roads, which offers to the business community
of every Atlantic seaport a choice of traffic routes and traffic

agencies, and they solicit business on the necessary under

standing that they shall respect the just rights and claims of
all localities, and not sacrifice to New York the interests

which are confided to them elsewhere.

It is also not misleading to speak of the Baltimore & Ohio

Railroad as a Baltimore road, for its interests, in the main,

centre in the City of Baltimore ; its bonds and stocks are

supposed to be mainly held or controlled there, and its traffic

is mainly between that city and the interior.

But this road,

no more than the New York roads, consents to stand apart

from the railroad system of the country, as a road limiting
its business to a single Atlantic terminus, and declining general
competition.

On the contrary, it solicits business at the

seaports to the north of Baltimore; and that its efforts

in that direction

have a fair measure of

success is evi

denced by the fact that in the year 1880 it carried of the

westward bound freight moved by the Trunk Line roads from

New York more than eight per cent., from Philadelphia more
than nine per cent., and from Boston about five per cent.,

and these proportions are fairly representative of the general

run of its traffic.

These facts are sufficient to show that

neither the New York roads nor the Baltimore road are so ex

clusively linked to the business interests of those cities re

spectively as to be either unable or unwilling to share in or

contribute to the prosperity of rival cities.

And it is now

publicly said and seems to be understood that the Baltimore

& Ohio is setking to obtain an independent line into New

York, that it may make its competition at that point still

more active and efficient.

It certainly cannot be claimed, with much appearance of

plausibility, that the Pennsylvania Railroad is the i·oad of any
particular city. The company which owns it is indeed a Penn-
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sylvania corporation, its offices are in the City of Philadelphia,

its stocks and bonds are largely held there, and perhaps not

largely held elsewhere in this country, and it is not improb-

able that the feelings and sympathies of those who manage

its concerns would incline them to desire specially the growth

and prosperity of Philadelphia above other places. But the

road has its eastern terminus, not at Philadelphia, but on the

harbor of New York, where it has made large and costly

preparations to compete with the 'Central and the Erie for

New York business. That it does compete with those roads

successfully is shown by the enormous amount of freight

which it moves from and carries into that city, and by the

fact that the merchants of New York have come to look upon

it, with entire justice, as one of their most important channels

of communication with the West. In the year 1880 this road

took out of New York twenty-six per cent. of the westbound

freight carried by the Trunk roads, and delivered to it nearly

twenty per cent. of the eastbound. While thus successfully

bidding for the custom and favor of New York, it is plain that

the Pennsylvania Eailroad cannot antagonize the interests of

New York unfairly, and must refrain from any attempt to

subordinate them to the rival interests which it also en-
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deavors to serve. It is a necessary condition of its competi-

tion for the trade of New York, that it shall make its services

beneficial, and that it shall offer facilities which are not sur-

passed by those offered by other roads. But the Pennsylvania

also, through its association with the Northern Central, com-

petes with marked success for the trade of Baltimore, and took

away from that city in the year 1880 twenty-three per cent.

of the westbound freight carried by the American Trunk

Line roads. Its share in the eastbound freight was still

more considerable, being forty per cent. What is said of its

relations to New York business may therefore with equal

truth be said of its relations to the business of Baltimore : it

must hold itself above the rivalries of locality, and assume

the attitude of an impartial carrier, desirous of the favor

and custom of the whole country, and willing and anxious to

serve all localities on such terms as are relatively equal and

substantially just.

sylvania corporation, its offices are in the City of Philadelphia,

its stocks and bonds are largely held there, and perhaps not
largely held elsewhere in this country, and it is not improb

able that the feelings and sympathies of those who manage

its concerns would incline them to desire specially the growth

and prosperity of Philadelphia above other places.

But the

road has its eastern terminus, not at Philadelphia, but on the

harbor of New York, where it has made large and costly

preparations to compete with the 'Central and the Erie for
New York business. That it does compete with those roads

successfully is shown by the enormous amount of freight

which it moves from and carries into that city, and by the
fact that the merchants of New York have come to look upon

it, with entire justice, as one of their most important channels

of communication with the West.

In the year 1880 this road

took out of New York twenty-six per cent. of the westbound
freight carried by the Trunk roads, and delivered to it nearly

twenty per cent. of the eastbound.

While thus successfully

bidding for the custom and favor of New York, it is plain that

the Pennsylvania Railroad cannot antagoni.Ze the interests of
New York unfairly, and must refrain from any attempt to
subordinate them to the rival interests which it also en
deavors to serve.

It is a necessary condition of its competi

tion for the trade of New York, that it shall make its services

beneficial, and that it shall offer facilities which are not sur

passed by those offered by other roads. But the Pennsylvania

also, through its association with the Northern Central, com
petes with marked success for the trade of Baltimore, and took
away from that city in the year 1880 twenty-three per cent.

of the westbound freight carried by the American Trunk

Line roads.

Its share in the eastbound freight was still

more considerable, being forty per cent.

What is said of its

relations to New York business may therefore with equal

truth be said of its relations to the business of Baltimore : it
must hold itself above the rivalries of locality, and assume
the attitude of an impartial carrier, desirous of the favor

and custom of the whole country, and willing and anxious to

serve all localities on such terms as are relatively equal and
f'mbstantially just.
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It is not likely that this reaching out of all the Trunk Line

roads to compete with each other in the several Atlantic

cities was contemplated when the roads were originally con-

structed ; but as the several lines have pushed their connec-

tions in the West in competition, it has been found desirable

for each to offer to its patrons the advantages of as many

markets as possible, and to carry for them, without breaking

bulk, whatever they have had for carriage in an eastward or

westward direction. Competition has thus made roads

national which were once local, and it is vain to expect that

so important a subject as that of differential rates will be

settled on the local preferences or prejudices of those who

may have authority in railroad circles. It must, therefore,

be settled either arbitrarily, by the fiat or agreement of the

transportation companies, or it must be determined by

some underlying principle. We agree with what was

said in the New York discussions and elsewhere, that any

arbitrary adjustments in disregard of such principles as

would naturally influence prices of transportation when un-

trammelled, would not, could not, and ought not to be upheld.

There should be—and as we think there must be—-some

principle by which to determine such a question, or perhaps

other.
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two or more principles acting upon and qualifying each

It has been assumed in the discussions we have listened

to, that business would be invited to a city by low rates upon

its railroad lines, and that the prosperity of the city would

bear some relation to these rates. How far this assumption

is likely to be well founded, we, of course, have no more

means of judging than has the general public. But the fact

that each of the Trunk Line roads has its relations to all the

cities, and each city receives benefits from all the roads, is

sufficient to suggest some question, whether low relative rates

and large relative business will necessarily go together.

Though it is true, as we think and have said, all the roads

which compete for the business of a place must treat its in-

terests fairly, and not subordinate them to the interests of

rival places; yet it must be expected that they will at all

It is not likely that this reaching out of all the Trunk Line

roads to compete with each other in the several Atlantic
cities was contemplated when the roads were originally con

structed ; but as the several lines have pushed their connec
tions in the West in competition, it has been found desirable

for each to offer to its patrons the advantages of as many
markets as possible, and to carry for them, without breaking
bulk, whatever they have had for carriage in

eastward or

an

made roads
national which were once local, and it is vain to expect that

westward

direction.

Competition

has

thus

so important a subject as that of differential rates will be

settled on the local preferences or prejudices of those who

may have authority in railroad circles. It must, therefore,
be settled either arbitrarily, by the fiat or agreement of the
transportation companies, or it must be determined by

some

underlying

principle.

We

agree

with

what

was

said in the New York discussions and elsewhere, that any
arbitrary adjustments in disregard of such principles as

would naturally influence prices of transportation when un

trammelled, would not, could not, and ought not to be upheld.

There should be-and as we think there must be-some

principle by which to determine such a question, or perhaps

two or more principles acting upon and qualifying each
other.

It has been assumed in the discussions we have listened

to, that business would be invited to a city by low rates upon

its railroad lines, and that the prosperity of the city would
bear some relation to these rates.

How far this assumption

is likely to be well founded, we, of course, have no more
means of judging than has the general public.

But the fact

that each of the Trunk Line roads has its relations to all the
cities, and each city receives benefits from all the roads, is

sufficient to suggest some question, whether low relative rates
a.nd large relative business will necessarily go
Though it is true, as

we

together.

think and have said, all the roads

which compete for the business of a place must treat its in
terests fairly, and not subordinate them to the interests of

rival places; yet it must be expected that they will at all
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times have primarily in view their own interests, and that

their zeal to procure business will bear some proportion to

the anticipated profits. If New York business is most remu-

nerative, it will be sought most eagerly; if not, the railroad

managers will direct attention to that which is. Reducing

the New York rates relatively to those of Philadelphia and

Baltimore, seems, therefore, to invite the roads to favor par-

ticularly the business of the two cities last named. Estab-

lishing differential rates in favor of Philadelphia and Baltimore

holds out inducements to the railroads to favor the New York

trade. The Pennsylvania Company may be expected to de-

sire to carry freights past Philadelphia to New York if it can

be paid for the additional haul, but to prefer to leave them

in Philadelphia, if for the considerable distance from there

to New York it will be paid nothing for the transportation.

Thus what each city asks, appears to have some tendency to

enlist the selfish interests of the railroad companies against

it. We mention this among other circumstances affecting

the question, without deeming it necessary to remark upon

it further.

THE PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD CONTKOL.

It seemed to be taken for granted, in the arguments pre-
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sented to us, that the existing differentials had not been

determined on any principle, but that they were the result of

a compromise between the railroad companies, whereby they

had purchased peace between themselves. Three different

principles, however, were suggested by different parties, as

those which should control, and these found advocates in

different localities, according as, it was thought, those locali-

ties would be favored by their operation respectively. These

three principles may be designated respectively : the distance

times have primarily in view their own interests, and that

their zeal to procure business will bear some proportion to
the anticipated profits. If New York business is most remu

nerative, it will be sought most eagerly; if not, the railroad

managers will direct attention to that which is.

Reducing

the New York rates relatively to those of Philadelphia and
Baltimore, seems, therefore, to invite the roads to favor par

ticularly the business of the two cities last �amed.

Estab

lishing differential rates in favor of Philadelphia and Baltimore
holds out inducements to the railroads to favor the New York
trade. The Pennsylvania Company may be expected to de

sire to carry freights past Philadelphia to New York if it can
be paid for the additional haul, but to prefer to leave them

in Philadelphia, if for the considerable distance from there
to New York it will be paid nothing for the transportation.

Thus what each city asks, appears to have some tendency to
enlist the selfish interests of the railroad companies against
it.

We mention this among other circumstances affecting

the question, without deeming it necessary to remark upon
it further.

principle, the cost principle, and the competitive principle. It

is, however, proper to say that those who advocated the first

and the second of these principles, generally agreed that the

third should not be discarded; but that it had its legitimate

place, and must have its legitimate influence also. Brief no-

tice will be taken of these three principles respectively.

THE

PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD

CONTROL.

It seemed to be taken for granted, in the arguments pre

sented to us, that the existing differentials had not been
determined on any principle, but that they were the result of

a compromise between the railroad companies, whereby they
had purchased peace between themselves.

Three different

principles, however, were suggested by different parties, as
those which should control, and these found advocates in

different localities, according as, it was thought, those locali

ties would be favored by their operation respectively.

These

three principles may be designated respectively : the distance
principle, the cost principle, and the competitive principle. It

is, however, proper to say that those who advocated the first

and the second of these principles, generally agreed that the
third should not be discarded ; but that it had its legitimate

place, and must have its legitimate influence also.

Brief no

tice will be taken of these three principles respectively.

13

THE DISTANCE PRINCIPLE.

13

It was contended by the commercial representatives of

Philadelphia and Baltimore, that freight charges on like

classes of freights between the interior and the seaboard cities

THE DISTANCE PRINCIPLE.

ought to be proportioned to distance. We understood them

to mean by this, that the shortest line from Chicago to each

of the Atlantic cities should be taken as the standard for

measuring the freight charges between Chicago and that city,

and that the charges for all the cities should then be deter-

mined by the mileage. By referring to the accompanying

note, it will be seen that if the mileage standard were

adopted, the freight charges between New York and Chicago

would be about ten per cent. greater than those between

Philadelphia and Chicago, and about thirteen per cent. more

than those between Baltimore and Chicago. Those between

New York and Cincinnati would be about twenty-eight per

cent. more than between Philadelphia and Cincinnati, and

about thirty-eight per cent. more than between Baltimore

and Cincinnati.* According to the average rates on grain

*DISTANCES VIA THE SHORTEST RAIL ROUTES TO

Boston. New York. Philadelphia. Baltimore.

Chicago 1,009 900 823 802
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Burlington, la 1,216 1,106 1,030 995

Cincinnati.. 927 743 667 576

Columbus, 0 807 623 547 512

Cleveland 671 580 504 483

Detroit 724 673 682 661

Indianapolis. 951 810 735 700

Kansas City 1,487 1,324 1,248 1,192

Louisville 1,161 870 794 706

It was contended by the commercial representatives of

Philadelphia and Baltimore, that freight charges on like
classes of freights between the interior and the seaboard cities
ought to be proportioned to distance.

We understood them

to mean by this, that the shortest line from Chicago to each

of the Atlantic cities should be taken as the standard for
measuring the freight charges between Chicago and that city,

and that the charges for all the cities should then be deter

mined by the mileage.

By referring to the accompanying

note, it will be seen that if

the mileage standard were

adopted, the freight charges between New York and Chicago

would be about ten per cent. greater than those between

Philadelphia and Chicago, and about thirteen per cent. morA
than those between Baltimore and Chicago. Those between

New York and Cincinnati would be about twenty-eight per
cent. more than between Philadelphia and Cincinnati, and

about thirty-eight per cent. more than between Baltimore

and Cincinnati.*

•

According to the average rates on grain

Memphis 1,438 1,247 1,171 1,083

Milwaukee 998 947 908 887

Omaha 1,503 1,393 1,317 1,294

*
DISTANCES VIA THE SHORTEST RAIL ROUTES TO

St Louis 1,212 1,050 973 917

St Paul 1,418 1,308 1,232 1,211

St Joseph 1,478 1,356 1,280 1,223

Toledo 784 693 617 596

Taking Boston as the standard, New York averages twelve per cent. nearer to

these towns, Philadelphia eighteen, and Baltimore twenty-two per cent. nearer.

Between New York and Chicago the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad is forty-

seven miles shorter than that by the Erie and its connections, fifty miles shorter

than that by the New York Central and its connections, and one hundred and

fourteen miles shorter than that by the Baltimore & Ohio and its connections.

Chicago .. . . . . . . . . . . .
Burlington, Ia . . . . . . .
Cincinnati .. .. . . . . . . .
Co\umuus, 0 ....... .
Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . .
Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indianapolis . .. .. .. . .
Kansas City . . . . . . . . .
Louisville . . . . . . . . . • .
Memphis . • • . . . . . . . .
Milwaukee . . . . . . . . • .
Omaha . . . . . . . • . . . . .
St. Louis . . . • . . . . . . . .
St. Paul . . . . . . . . . . . •
St. Joseph . . . . . . . . . .
Toledo . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Boston.

New York.

1 ,009
1,216
927
807
671
7 24
95 1
1,487
1, 1 6 1

900
1, 106
7 43
623
580
673
810
1 , 3 24
870
1 , 2 47
947

1,438

998

1,503
1 , 21 2
1 ,418
1,478
784

Philadelphia.
823
1,030
667
547
504,
682
735
1 , 248
7 94
1, 1 7 1
908
1,317
973
1 , 232
1 , 280
617

1,393

1 , 050
1 , 308
1 , 356
693

Baltimore.
802
9 95
576
612
483
661
7 00
1, 192
7 06
1,083
887
1 , 294
917
1, 2 1 1
1,2 2 3

596

Taking Boston as the standard, New York averages twelve per cent. nearer to
these towns, Philadelphia eighteen, and Baltimore twenty-two per cent. nearer.
Between New York and Chicago the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad

is forty·

seven miles shorter than that by the Erie and its connections, fifty miles shorter
than that by the New York Central and its connections, and one hundred and
fourteen miles shorter than that by the Baltimore

&

Ohio and its connections.

14

and provisions this year, the differentials have only been

14

about six and two thirds per cent. in favor of Philadelphia,

and ten per cent. in favor of Baltimore; and the distance

principle would, therefore, on an average, increase them

greatly. It was urged that it was by this principle that the

several roads, constituting a competing line, are accustomed

to apportion their joint charges, and that these very Trunk

Lines adopt it in dividing the charges upon through freights

with the roads from which they receive the freight, or to

which they deliver it. The New York representatives, on the

other hand, contended that the distance principle could not

with any justice control, for the reason that distance does not

measure either the cost or the value of the service; so that

if adopted as the standard of charges, it would be an arbi-

trary standard, and the element of equity in the rates would

be disregarded.

If there were between each of the Atlantic cities and the

interior towns only a single line of railroad communication,

some of the difficulties in the way of the application of the

distance principle, which are now obvious, would be wanting.

But, as has been said already, every one of those cities has

several lines, and would be content with no less. The sup-
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posed distance principle ignores this fact: selecting the

shortest line to each city, to the disregard of the rest, and

estimating the charges in proportion to its length. It might

thus happen that the charges on freights from Chicago to the

several seaboard cities, with all their roads taken into the ac-

count, would bear no proportion whatever to the distance; and

it is certain that as between the roads serving the same city, the

supposed principle could not be applied at all, for they,

irrespective of distance, must conform to the lowest rates.

The distance apportionment would, therefore, not be an

apportionment of principle, but only of expediency; and

whether expedient or not, must depend somewhat on other

considerations, which present themselves in the practical

administration of railroad affairs.

It cannot be said, however, that distance is a circumstance

without value in the determination of railroad tariffs; it is,

and proVIs10ns this year, the differentials have only been
about six and two thirds per cent. in favor of Philadelphia,
and ten per cent. in favor of Baltimore; and the distance

principle would, therefore, on an average, increase them
greatly. It was urged that it was by this principle that the
several roads, constituting a competing line, are accustomed
to apportion their joint charges, and that these very Trunk

Lines adopt it in dividing the charges upon through freights

with the roads from which they receive the freight, or to
which they deliver it.

The New York representatives, on the

other hand, contended that the distance principle could not

with any justice control, for the reason that distance does not
measure either the cost or the value of the service; so that

if adopted as the standard of charges, it would be an arbi
trary standard, and the element of equity in the rates would
be disregarded.
If there were between each of the Atlantic cities and the

interior towns only a single line of railroad communication,
some of the difficulties in·the way of the application of the

distance principle, which are now obvious, would be wanting.

But, as has been said already, every one of those cities has
several lines, and would be content with no less.

The sup
posed distance principle ignores this fact : selecting the

shortest line to each city, to the disregard of the rest, and

estimating the charges in proportion to its length.

It might

thus happen that the charges on freights from Chicago to the
several seaboard cities, with all their roads taken into the ac

count, would bear no proportion whatever to the distance; and

it is certain that as between the roads serving the same city, the
supposed principle could not be applied at all, for they,

irrespective of distance, must conform to the lowest rates.

The distance apportionment would, therefore, not be an

apportionment of principle, but only of expediency; and

whether expedient or not, must depend somewhat on other
considerations, which present themselYes in the practical
administration of railroad affairs.

It cannot be said, however, that distance is a circumstance

without value in the determination of railroad tariffs ; it is,

15

on the other hand, one of much importance. Nearness to the

15

producers and consumers of the articles which it handles is

a great advantage to any city; and so far as the rivals of

New York are possessed of this advantage, they are justified

in expecting that it will be recognized. But the value of this

advantage is a question that must be determined with many

other things taken into the account, and can only be fully

solved in the tests of competition. The general fact now is

that distance does not determine railroad charges, and that

where competition is most active it influences them the least.

The distance principle does not, therefore, stand the test of

competition, and so far as we can perceive, there is no possi-

bility of establishing it except by subordinating competition

altogether to it. But to do this would require an exercise of

arbitrary authority which we do not understand those who

advocate the distance principle to advise or desire. We

must conclude, therefore, that distance cannot supply for us

the controlling principle, and that its proper influence upon

transportation charges cannot be determined either arbi-

trarily or as a matter of antecedent computation or estimate.

THE COST PRINCIPLE.

New York parties who rejected the distance principle were
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inclined to favor the grading of rates by the cost of service;

and if this were done, they claimed that the differentials

would disappear altogether. Cost of service is here employed

as synonymous with the phrase cost of moving freight, which

is most commonly used. The latter phrase, however, is used

in two very different senses, which it may be important to

distinguish in order to avoid misconception. Eailroad com-

panies use the phrase for their own purposes when making

reports to their stockholders or for the public under the re-

on the other hand, one of much importance.

Nearness to the

producers and consumers of the articles which it handles is
a great advantage to any city ; and so far as the rivals of
New York are possessed of this advantage, they ai·e justified
in expecting that it will be recognized.

But the value of this

advantage is a question that must be determined with many

other things taken into the account, and can only be fully
solved in the tests of competition.

The general fact now is

that distance does not determine railroad charges, and that

where competition is most active it influences them the least.
The distance principle does not, therefore, stand the test of

competition, and so far as we can perceive, there is no possi

bility of establishing it except by subordinating competition
altogether to it.

But to do this would require an exercise of

arbitrary authority which we do not understand those who

advocate the distance principle to advise or desire.

We

must conclude, therefore, that distance cannot supply for us
the controlling principle, and that its proper influence upon

transportation charges cannot be determined either arbi
trarily or as a matter of antecedent computation or estimate.

quirements of State laws. In such reports cost of moving

freight will be understood to be the actual outlay by the rail-

THE COST PRINCIPLE.

road company in moving its freight over a completed and

equipped road. This outlay will embrace the cost of fuel,

the compensation to the regular freight agents, to freight

solicitors, if any, to the servants employed to handle the

New York parties who rejected the distance principle were

inclined t.o favor the grading of rates by the cost of service;
and if this were done, they claimed that the differentials
would disappear altogether.

Cost of service is here employed

as synonymous with the phrase cost of moving freight, which

is most commonly used.

The latter phrase, however, is used

in two very different senses, which it may be important to
distinguish in order to avoid misconception.

Railroad com

panies use the phrase for their own purposes when making

reports to their stockholders or for the public under the re

quirements of State laws.

In such reports cost of moving

freight will be understood to be the actual outlay by the rail
road company in moving its freight over a completed and
equipped road.

This outlay will embrace the cost of fuel,

the compensation to the regular freight agents, to freight

solicitors, if any, to the servants employed to handle the

16

16

freight and govern and move the trains. It must also embrace

the necessary expense of keeping good the freight equipment,

and it should include a fair proportion of all such expenses of

the company as are incurred for the freight and passenger

traffic in common, such as repairs of track, taxes, official

salaries, legal expenses, office expenses, general advertising,

etc. To all these must be added the cost of insurance against

losses to freight and freight equipment by casualties of all

descriptions, or of making good such losses. If all these

items are added together, and the sum total is divided by the

number of tons of freight moved one mile upon the road, we

have as the result the average cost of transporting a ton of

freight for one mile of distance.

The report which gives these items will also give others

that, as between the railroad company and its patrons, must

be understood as constituting a part of the cost of service.

If the company owes debts, the interest paid upon these

should be included; if it has made dividends to its stock-

holders, the amount should be included also. Indeed, it is

generally conceded that the cost of service should rightfully

and equitably be made to include a f;iir return in interest or

dividends on the cost of the railroad investment; though as
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to what return is fair and reasonable, differences in opinion

are held and expressed. But for our present purposes it is

sufficient to leave any such differences out of view, and to

speak in general terms of the cost principle as that which

would measure the railroad charges by the cost of service,

and which would make the cost of service embrace the actual

outlay of the railroad company as above explained, and a fair

return in interest or dividends on the cost of the road and its

equipment.

To show that the cost principle would be to the advantage

of New York, it became necessary to show that the cost of

transporting freight between New York and Chicago was or

ought to be less than the cost between Philadelphia and

Chicago, or Baltimore and Chicago, or at least that it was not

greater. But upon this point, unfortunately, the information

that was produced before us did not appear to be very pre-

freight and govern and move the trains.

It must also embrace

the necessary expense of keeping good the freight equipment,

and it should include a fair proportion of all such expenses of
·
the company as are incurred for the freight and passenger
traffic in common, such as repairs of track, taxes, official
salaries, legal expenses, office expenses, general advertising,

etc.

To all these must be 8.dded the. cost of insurance against

losses to freight and freight equipment by casualties of all

descriptions, or of making good such losses.

If all these

items are added together, and the sum total is divided by the

number of tons of freight moved one mile upon the road, we

have as the result the average cost of transporting a ton of

freight for one mile of distance.

The report which gives these items will also give others
that, as between the railroad company and its patrons, must
be understood as constituting a part of the cost of service.

If the company owes debts, the interest paid upon these

should be included ; if it has made dividends to 1ts stock

holders, the amount should be included also.' Indeed, it is

generally conceded t.hat the cost of service sll.ould rightfully

and equitably be made to include

a

fair ret u r� in interest

or

dividends on the cost of the railroad investment ; though as

to what return is fair aud reasonable, differences in opinion
are

held and expressed.

But for our present purposes it is

sufficient to leave any such differences out of view, .and to

speak in general terms of the cost principle as that which
would measure the railroad charges by the cost of service,

and which would make the cost of service embrace the actual
outlay of the railroad company as above explained, and

a

f�ir

retmn in i11ten'st or dividends on the cost of the road an<l its
e1p1ip11wnt.

To Hh< l\Y that the cost principle would be to the advantage

uf New York, it became necessary to show that the cost of

transporting freight between New York and Chicago was or

ought to be less than the oost between Philadelphia and

Chicago, or Baltimore and Chicago, or at least that it was not

greater.

But upon this point, unfortun�tely, the information

that was produced before us did not appear to be very pre-
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cise or very accurate. The expressions of opinion were in-

deed clear and strong, but they were generally supported by

argument and inference rather than by evidence. Our atten-

tion was not directed to .official reports or figures, where or

by which the actual cost was set forth, but rather to the

topographical features of the country between New York and

the head of Lake Michigan, which it was said offered admir-

able facilities for the construction of railroads, which would

be economical in original outlay, and economical also in their

operation. No such economical road, it was said, had been

or could be constructed further to the south, and the unfa-

vorable gradients and curvatures on the Pennsylvania and

the Baltimore <fe Ohio roads more than deprive them of all

the advantages which they possess in shorter distance. It

was also urged that another important circumstance should

be taken into the account when the cost is being estimated.

By far the larger portion of all the freight carried by the

Trunk Lines is eastward bound. When cost is considered the

probability of return freights must be taken into the account,

since to whatever extent the cars which convey freight to the

seaboard must be returned without loading, the cost of the re-

turn must be reckoned as part of the cost of transporting
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the eastbound freight. And it was confidently asserted that

the probability of obtaining remunerative return freights was

much greater at New York than elsewhere on the Atlantic

coast.

To make out the case of more favorable lines and gradients

between Chicago and New York, the route is required, after

it leaves the shore of Lake Erie, to follow substantially the

course of the Erie Canal to the Hudson, and thence down

that river. By that route a road has been constructed

with few unfavorable grades and curves, and this road

no doubt is or can be operated with much greater economy

than would be possible if its line were through a mountainous

region. But if we take this as the route for freight

transportation between New York and the interior, and

compare it with the routes to Philadelphia and Baltimore

over the roads which carry most freights to those cities re-

c1se or very accurate.

The expressions of opm10n were in

deed clear and strong, but they were generally supported by
argument and inference rather than by evidence. Our atten
tion was not dire cted to .official reports or figures, where or
by which the actual cost was set forth, but rather to the
topographical features of the country between New York and
the head of Lake Michigan, which it was said offered admir
able facilities for the construction of railroads, which would

be e conomical in original outlay, and economical also in their
operation.

No such economical road, it was said, had been

or could be constructed further to the south, and the unfa
vorable gradients and curvatures on the Pennsylvania and
the Baltimore & Ohio roads more than deprive them of all
the advantages which they possess in shorter distance.

It

was also urged that another important circumstance should
be taken into the account when the cost is being estimated�
By far the larger portion of all the freight carried by the
Trunk Lines is eastward bound.

When cost is considered the

probability of return freights must be taken into the account,
since to whatever extent the cars which convey freight to the
seaboard must be returned without loading, the cost of the re
turn must be re ckoned as part of the cost of transporting
the eastbound freight.

And it was confidently asserted that.

the probability of obtaining remunerative return freights was.
much greater at New York than elsewhere on the Atlantio
coast.
To make out the case of more favorable lines and gradients
between Chicago and New York, the route is required, after
'
it leaves the shore of Lake Erie, to follow substantially the
course of the Erie Canal to the Hudson, and thence down
that river.
with few

By . that route a road has been constructed
unfavorable grades and curves, and

this

road

no doubt is or can be operated with much greater economy
'.
than would be possibfe if its line were through a mountainous
region.

But if we take

transportation

between

this

New

as the

route

for

freight

York and the interior, and

compare it with the routes to Philadelphia and Baltimore
over the roads which carry most freights to those cities re-
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spectively, we commit the mistake of directing our attention

exclusively to the one road which possesses this favorable line,

and ignoring altogether the fact that New York has other

roads which it is desirable for its interest should live and

prosper, and that over each of them the active and energetic

merchants and manufacturers of that city are seeking the

business of the interior and inviting its custom. Every one

of those roads brings to New York a large amount of trade

which would not be obtained without its facilities ; and it

seems certain that New York cannot afford to ignore any one

road, any more when it is settling its grievances with rivals

than when estimating advantages over them. If, therefore,

it be demonstrated that the New York Central and its con-

necting roads can transport western products from the interior

to New York as cheaply as the more southern roads can move

them to Baltimore or Philadelphia, it may not follow that the

interest of New York would be subserved by the adoption of

the cost principle and the bringing of the charges on freight

transportation to and from New York to the test of what the

Central could afford. Prudence would require that at least the

probable consequences should be considered; and if among

these consequences should be the possibility of some other
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line to New York being found unable to endure the test of the

cost principle, this of itself ought to raise some doubt whether

the city of New York could be interested in establishing

it. Now, the very claim that is made in behalf of the New

York Central route, as one of remarkable economy, assumes

that the Pennsylvania route is less economical; and the as-

sertion that the Central can carry from Chicago to New York

as cheaply as the Pennsylvania can carry from Chicago to

Philadelphia, contains within it—since the less is contained

in the greater—that the Central can carry from Chicago to

New York cheaper than the Pennsylvania, which only reaches

New York by carrying past Philadelphia, can possibly do.

The application of the cost principle, if made under such cir-

cumstances, must force the Pennsylvania to this alternative:

that it must carry at rates which will not give to the com-

pany a fair return in profits, or it must give up competition

spectively, we commit the mistake of directing our attention

exclusively to the one road which possesses this favorable line,

and ignoring altogether the fact that New York has other

roads which it is desirable for its interest should live and

prosper, and that over each of them the active and energetic

merchants and manufacturers of that city are seeking the

business of the interior and inviting its custom.

Every one

of those roads b�ings to New York a large amount of trade

which would not be obtained without its facilities ; and it

seems certain that New York cannot afford to ignore any one
road, any more when it is settling its grievances with rivals

than when estimating advantages over them.

If, therefore,

it be demonstrated that the New York Central and its con

necting roads can transport western products from the interior

to New York as cheaply as the more southern roads can move

them to Baltimore or Philadelphia, it may not follow that the

interest of New York would be subserved by the adoption of

the cost principle and the bringing of the charges on freight
transportation to and from New York to the test of what the
Central could afford. Prudence would require that at least the

probable consequences should be considered; and if among

these consequences should be the possibility of some other

line to New York being found unable to endure the test of the

cost principle, this of itself ought to raise some doubt whether

the city of New York could be interested in establishing

it.

Now, the very claim that is made in behalf of the New

York Central route, as one of remarkable economy, assumes
that the Pennsylvania route is less economical; and the as

sertion that the Central can carry from Chicago to New York

as cheaply as the Pennsylvania can carry from Chicago to

Philadelphia, contains within it-since the less is contained
in the greater-that the Central can carry from Chicago to

New York cheaper than the Pennsylvania, which only reaches

New York by carrying past Philadelphia, can possibly do.

The application of the cost principle, if made under such cir

cumstances, must force the Pennsylvania to this alternative:
that it must carry at rates which will not give to the com

pany a fair return in profits, or it must give up competition

19
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ior New York business ; and the Erie, whose line is also as-

sumed to be less favorable than that of the Central, might be

compelled to face the same alternative. It probably would

not be contended that either the Grand Trunk or the Balti-

more & Ohio, whose lines to New York, through connecting

roads, are so much longer than those of the Pennsylvania,

could compete at all for New York business under a strict

application of the cost principle. The natural tendency of

its application would, therefore, be in the direction of throw-

ing upon one of the existing lines to New York the bulk of

the New York business, to the destruction of the others, and

to the final destruction of competition. It is not to be as-

sumed that this is what New York desires. Every great city

.finds it conducive to its prosperity to secure as many of these

.avenues of trade and travel as possible ; and it is certainly

not more important to gain a new line than to preserve one

-already in existence, and already equipped with all those

powers of usefulness which a new project can only promise

at some time in the future. If, therefore, the cost principle

were to be adopted for regulating the charges as between the

competing cities, it would seem that New York ought to

bring into the calculation not one road only, and that the one
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.most economical in construction and operation, but all the

roads which contribute to its prosperity, and which it desires

to retain.

At Philadelphia and Baltimore it is asserted with great

1or New York business; and the Erie, whose line is also as
�sumed to be less favorable than that of the Central, might be
compelled to face the same alternative.

It probably would

not be contended that either the Grand Trunk or the Balti
more & Ohio, whose lines to New York, through connecting
.roads, are so much longer than those of the Pennsylvania,
-could compete at all for New York business under a strict
application of the cost principle.

The natural tendency of

its application would, therefore, be in the direction of throw
ing upon one of the existing lines to New York the bulk of
the New York business, to the destruction of the others, and
to the final destruction of competition.

It is not to be as

sumed that this is what New York desires.

Every great city

.finds it conducive to its prosperity to secure as many of these
a.venues of trade and travel as possible ; and it is certainly
not more important to gain a new line than to preserve one
.already in existence, and already equipped with all those

confidence that over no one of the New York roads can

freights be conveyed as cheaply, from Chicago to New York,

-as they can be over the Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore &

Ohio roads to Philadelphia and Baltimore respectively. For

this confidence certain facts are stated which are supposed

to be sufficient to produce the result, and official reports are

cited as evidence that the result has followed. The favorable

lines of the New York Central, and its affiliated roads, are

admitted; but it is contended that all the advantage of these

is more than neutralized by greater distance and the greater

,cost of fuel to the New York roads over those to the south of

ihem. The Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore & Ohio roads

powers of usefulness which a new project can only promise
.at some time in the future.

If, therefore, the cost principle

were to be adopted for regulating the charges as between the
competing cities, it would seem that New York ought to
bring into the calculation not one road only, and that the one
.most economical in construction and operation, but all the
.roads which contribute to its prosperity, and which it desires
.to retain.
At Philadelphia and Baltimore it is asserted with great
-confidence that over no one of the New York roads can
freights be conveyed as cheaply, from Chicago to New York,
.as they can be over the Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore &
Ohio roads to Philadelphia and Baltimore respectively.

For

this confidence certain facts are stated which are supposed
to be sufficient to produce the result, and official reports are
-cited as evidence that the result has followed.

The favorable

lines of the New York Central, and its affiliated roads, are
admitted; but it .is contended that all the advantage of these
is more than neutralized by greater distance and the greater
-cost of fuel to the New York roads over those to the south of
-them.

The Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore & Ohio roads
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find the coal, which represents their motive power, in beds

at various points on their lines, and can take it up for use at

little more than the cost of handling ; while the New York

roads, on the other hand, and especially the Central, must

transport the coal for a long distance at a cost two or three

times as great. This cost constitutes a very considerable

part of the total expense of moving freight, and it cannot be

overlooked or treated as of little moment.

The official figures to which attention was called to show

the greater cost on the New York lines are to be found in the

reports of the New York Central, the Erie and the Pennsyl-

vania, made by the directors to the stockholders, to show the

operation of the roads for the years 1880 and 1881. In those

reports estimates are made of the cost to the companies re-

spectively of moving one ton of freight for one mile of dis-

tance, omitting from the calculation the items of interest and

profits. The reports, as will be seen on referring to the note

in the margin, make a very iinfavorable showing for New

York ;* and if the figures told the whole story, and if we

could be assured that they were made by each company on

the same basis, they would go very far toward justifying the

other cities in the claims they make. But, unfortunately, these
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reports are, for our purpose, of little value. They cover too

much in some respects, and too little in others, to give us

the information we need. 1. The Trunk Line companies re-

port the cost over their own roads only, and do not include

the cost over the feeder roads ; but what we need to know is

the cost of transportation over the whole line from western

points to the seaboard. 2. The companies in their reports do

not discriminate between the cost of transporting local freight

and through freight, but endeavor only to give the average

cost of moving both. But here the reports embrace too

much for our purposes, for on this inquiry we are interested

* Cost of moving freight per ton for one mile of distance:

On the New York Central, 1880, 5.41 mills. 1881, 5.62 mills.

On the Erie, " 5.34 " " 5.29 "

On the Pennsylvania, " 4.74 " " 4.37 "

No corresponding figures are given in the reports of the Baltimore & Ohio R.E. Co.

find the coal, which represents their motive power, in beds
at various points on their lines, and can take it up for use at
little more than the cost of handling; while the New York
roads, on the other hand, and especially the Central, must
transport the coal for a long distance at a cost two or three
times as great.

This cost constitutes a very considerable

part of the total expense of moving freight, and it cannot be
overlooked or treated as of little moment.
The official figures to which attention was called to show
the greater cost on the New York lines are to be found in the
reports of the New York Central, the Erie and the Pennsyl
vania, made by the directors to the stockholders, to show the
operation of the roads for the years 1880 and 1881.

In those

reports estimates are made of the cost to the companies re
spectively of moving one ton of freight for oiie mile of dis
tance, omitting from the calculation the items of interest and
profits.

The reports, as will be seen on referring to the note

in the margin, make a very unfavorable showing for New
York;* and if the figures told the whole story, and if we
could be assured that they were made by each company on
the same basis, they would go very far toward justifying the
other cities in the claims they make. But, unfortunately, these
reports are� for our purpose, of little value.

They cover too

·much in some respects, and too little in others, to give us
,
the information we need. 1. The Trunk Line companies re
port the cost over their own roads only, and do not include
the cost over the feeder roads; but what we need to know is
the cost of transportation over the whole line from western
points to the seaboard.

2. The companies in their reports do

not discriminate between the cost of transporting local freight
and through freight, but endeavor only to give the average
cost of moving both.

But here the reports embrace too

much for our purposes, for. on this inquiry we are interested
_
*

Cost of moving frei�ht per ton for one mile of distance:
On the New York Central, 1880, 6.41 mille.

1 8 8 1, 6.62 mills.

On the Erie,

"

6.34

"

"

6.29

On the Pennsylvania,

"

4.'14

"

"

4.3'1

No corresponding figures are given in the reports

"

''

of the Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.
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only in the cost of moving through freight. If the freights

21

over all the roads were similar in kind, and if the proportion

of through freight to way freight were nearly the same on all,

the report of average cost might be accepted as indicating the

proportionate cost to each road of its through freights. But

we must take notice of the fact, which is matter of common

knowledge, that the character of local freight is exceedingly

diverse on the different roads, and that the cost of handling

is far from being uniform. If one company, for example,

handles coal in large quantities as way freight, loading a train

completely at one station, and moving it to another for com-

plete unloading, the cost of such business would furnish very

unsafe and unreliable means of comparison with that of the

local freight of miscellaneous articles, which another road

might pick up in small quantities at many way stations, and

deliver at as many more. But these railroad companies, unfor-

tunately, have as yet agreed upon no uniform method of keep-

ing accounts, whereby they may determine, by the same stand-

ards, the actual outlay of the roads in moving their freights.

It would seem that there ought to be no differences in this par-

ticular ; but the official reports sometimes disclose on exami-

nation that the diversities are very considerable, and are not
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infrequently met with in the accounts of the same company.

One company, for example, when it is able to make such

only in the cost of moving through freight.

If the freights

over all the roads were similar in kind, and if the proport�on
of through freight to way freight were nearly the same on all,
the report of average cost might be accepted as indicating the
proportionate cost to each road of its through freights.

But

we must take notice of the fact, which is matter of common
knowledge, that the character of local freight is exceedingly
diverse on the different roads, and that the cost of handling
is far from being uniform.

If one company, for example,

handles coal in large quantities as way freight, loading

a.

train

completely at one station, and moving it to another for com
plete unloading, the cost of such business would furnish very
unsafe and unreliable means of comparison with that of the
local freight of miscellaneous articles, which another road
might pick up in small quantities at many way stations, and

betterments as station houses, warehouses and side tracks

from its current receipts without increasing its indebtedness,

may charge the cost to operating expenses, while another

under similar circumstances would charge them to construc-

tion account, and still another would include them in operat-

ing expenses for the time being, and at the end of several

years perhaps transfer them to construction account for the

purposes of a new issue of stock. Evidences of these differ-

ent methods of procedure appeared in reports of different

companies, which were made use of for their information or

for the purposes of illustration before us. It is no doubt

undesirable that there should be this diversity in practice;

but while it exists it is necessary to take notice of it. If

concert of action among railroad managers could bring about

deliver at as many more. But these railroad companies, unfor
tunately, have as yet agreed upon no uniform method of keep
ing accounts, whereby they may determine, by the same stand
ards, the actual outlay of the roads in moving their freights.

It would seem that there ought to be no differences in this par
ticular ; but the official reports sometimes disclose on exami
nation that the diversities are very considerable, and are not
infrequently met with in the accounts of the same company.
One company, for example, when it is able to make such
betterments

as

station houses, warehouses and side tracks

from its current receipts without increasing its indebtedness,
may charge the cost to operating expenses, while another
under similar circumstances would charge them to construc
tion account, and still another would include them in operat
ing expenses for the time being, and at the end of several
years perhaps transfer them to construction account for the
purposes of a new issue of stock.

Evidences of these differ

ent methods of procedure appeared in reports of different
companies, which were made u�e of for their information or
for the purposes of illustration before us.

It is no doubt

undesirable that there should be this diversity in practice;
but while it exists it is necessary .to take notice of it.

If

concert of action among railroad managers could bring about

22

a uniform system. of accounts, so that the official reports

22

based upon them, which are made periodically for the infor-

mation of shareholders, might give valuable and reliable in-

formation and means of accurate comparison to the public as

well, the change in methods would be likely to prevent many

misconceptions and misconstructions of corporate action

which now arise in the public mind, and which lead to both-

public and corporate annoyances.

For all the reasons assigned, we are without reliable in-

formation by which to apply the cost principle in the regu-

lation of charges of transportation between the Atlantic cities

and the interior, and we cannot say that the application

would be to the advantage of New York. Prima fade the

case seems to be against New York, especially when the

Pennsylvania Railroad, which constitutes one of its most im-

portant lines, is taken into the account. It is very manifest

that that railroad can leave freights at Philadelphia more

cheaply than it can transport them the additional eighty-

seven miles to New York, and probably it can deliver them

for still less at Baltimore, since the unfavorable grades of

the road, to which much importance was attached in the

New York arguments, are all passed before Harrisburgh is
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reached, and from that point the line made use of by the

Pennsylvania to reach Baltimore, is shorter than the line to

Philadelphia.

The favorable influence which the concentration of foreign

commerce at New York ought to have upon railroad rates

between that city and the interior, may perhaps be something,

for freight tariffs ought to be, and will be, arranged with re-

gard to the probability of compensating freights in both di-

rections. When a railroad company can have freights in one

direction only, and must return its cars empty, it must neces-

sarily make the freights pay for the cost of the return. In

the eastern and western transportation we have an illustra-

tion of this state of things. It is matter of familiar knowl-

edge, that much the largest proportion of freight is eastward

bound, and that large numbers of unloaded cars are con-

stantly being sent west over all the roads. If the course of

a· uniform system of accounts, so that the official reports
based upon them, which are made periodically for the infor
mation of shareholders, might give valuable and reliable in
formation and means of accurate comparison to the public as
well, the change in methods would be likely to prevent many
misconceptions and misconstructions

of

corporate

action

which now arise in the public mind, and which lead to both.
public and corporate annoyances.
For all the reasons assigned, we are without reliable in
formation by which to apply the cost principle in the regu
lation of charges of transportation between the Atlantic cities
and the interior, and we cannot say that the application
would be to the advantage of New York.

Prima facie the

case seems to be against New York, especially when the
Pennsylvania Railroad, which constitutes one of its most im-·
portant lines, is taken into the account.

It is very manifest.

that that railroad can leave freights at Philadelphia more
cheaply than it can transport them the additional eighty
seven miles to New York, and probably it can deliver them
for still less at Baltimore, since the unfavorable grades of
the road, to which much importance was attached in the

New York arguments, are all passed before Harrisburgh is
reached, and from that point the line made use of by the
Pennsylvania to reach Baltimore, is shorter than the line

�o

Philadelphia.
The favorable influence which the concentration of foreign
commerce at New York ought to have upon railroad rates
between that city and the interior, may perhaps be something,.
for freight tariffs ought to be, and will be, arranged with re
gard to the probability of compensating freights in both di
rections.

When a railroad company can have freights in one

direction only, and must return its cars empty, it must neces
sarily make the freights pay for the cost of the return.
the eastern and western tran�portation we have
tion of this state of things.

an

In

illustra

It is matter of familiar knowl

edge, that much the largest proportion of freight is eastward
bound, and that large numbers of unloaded cars are con
stantly being sent west over all the roads.

If the course of

23

23

trade were such, that any one of the Atlantic cities sent out

by rail as much freight as it received, its advantage over

the others would be obviously very great Kailroad

companies could afford to make much better rates upon

all freights bound to the city from which they were cer-

tain of compensating return loads. It is proper, therefore,

that railroad companies should take into consideration the

condition of things in this regard, and every participant in

foreign commerce has a right to expect that this will be

done. We have therefore directed our own attention to the

differences in the freights received and those sent out by the

four leading Atlantic seaboard cities over the four American

Trunk Lines, and have given in a marginal note the aggregates

for the year 1880, which will be sufficient for the purposes of

approximate comparison.* The table shows that the pro-

portion of freight sent out from New York over these roads,

when compared with that which is received from them, is

considerably greater than the proportion at either Baltimore

trade were such, that any one of the Atlantic cities sent out
by ra.il as much freight as it received, its advantage ove r
the

others

would

be

obviously

very

great.

Railroad

.companies could afford to make much better rates upon
all frehrhts bound to the city from which they were cer
tain of compensating return loads.

It is proper, therefore,

that railroad companies should take into consideration the
condition of things in this regard, and every participant

iii

foreign commerce has a right to expect that this will be
done.

we have therefore directed our own attention to the

differences in the freights received and those sent out by the

or Philadelphia, but it is nevertheless only as one to four

and a quarter, and it is manifest that not only must a large

proportion of all the cars which go loaded to New York re-

turn without loads, but that a much more considerable num-
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ber must so return from New York than from either of the

other cities.

While, therefore, New York has an advantage over its

rivals, in the larger proportion of westbound to eastbound

freight, the advantage, if estimated by the bulk, is not very

great. And it must be borne in mind that these four cities

do not by any means furnish to the roads all their west-

*Preight Tonnage by the four American Trunk Line roads (or the year 1880 :

HECB1YED. SENT.

New York 4,266,830 1,022,612

Boston 913,887 309,232

Philadelphia 1,553,381 299,474

Baltimore 1,559,251 241,690

As the business with the Grand Trunk of Canada is not covered by this state-

ment, it will be readily understood that the statement is not so favorable to Boston

as it should be, as its business with the Grand Trunk is very large.

four leading Atlantic seaboard cities over the four American
Trunk Lines, and have given in a marginal note the aggregates
for the year 1880, which will be sufficient for the purposes of
approximate comparison.*

The table shows that the pro

portion of freight sent out from New York over these roads,
when compared with that which is received from them, is
considerably greater than the proportion at either Baltimore
or Philadelphia, but it is nevertheless only as one to four
and a quarter, and it is manifest that not only must a large
proportion of all the cars which go loaded to New York re
turn without loads, but that a much more considerable num
ber must so return from New York than from either of the
other cities.
While, therefore, New York has an advantage over its
rivals, in the larger proportion of westbound to eastbound
freight, the advantage, if estimated by the bulk, is not very
great.

And it must be borne in mind that these four cities

do not by any means furnish to the roads all their west*Freight Tonnage by the four AmeriC11.n Trunk Line roads for the year 1880 :
New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Boston .

.

. . • . • . . . . . . • • • • • • . . .

Philadelphia .
Bal ti more .

• • . . . . . . . • • . . . .

• . . . • • .

.

. . . . . . • . .

l!.ECll:I V BD.

BENT.

4,266, 8 3 0

1 , 0 2 2, 6 1 2

913,887

309,232

1 , 5 53,38 1

299,4 7 4

1, 569, 2 5 1

241 , 690

As the business with the Grand Trunk of Canada is not covered by this state
ment, it will be readily understood that the statemeut is not so favorable to Boston
as it should be, as its business with the Grand Trunk is very large.
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bound freight, but that they take large quantities from other

24

towns along their line. It may be that New York westbound

freights average highest in the freight tariffs, but even then

the relative advantage of New York will probably be less con-

siderable than some of its advocates have supposed. And

on a careful examination of all the arguments advanced at

New York, we are not satisfied that a strict application of the

cost principle, if it should be found susceptible of applica-

tion, would be likely. to benefit the trade of that city in its

rivalry with the other Atlantic cities.

But if the exact cost of transporting freight by rail were

attainable, could it be made .the standard whereby to measure

the charges as between competing cities ? We do not consider

now what might be just and right as between a railroad company

and its patrons if the case of any railroad company could be

taken up and considered by itself apart from all others, but of

what is practicable in view of existing facts. If the cost prin-

bound freight, but that they take large quantities from other
towns along their line.

freights average highest in the freight tariffs, but even then
the relative advantage of New York will probably be less con
siderable than some of its advocates have supposed.

on a careful examination of all the arguments advanced at
cost principle, if it should be found susceptible of applica
tion, would be likely. to benefit the trade of that city in it.a
rivalry with the other Atlantic cities.

B ut if the exact cost of transporti n g f re igh t by rail

of the country could justly complain of it. If they could all

above explained, they would benefit their average condition

very greatly by accepting it, for they are not now receiving
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on an average anything near the average legal interest of the

country on the cost of their investments.* Many of the com-

panies—perhaps the majority of them—in order to realize cost

would be compelled to increase their charges very considerably,

while others, including perhaps some of these Trunk Lines, might

be called upon for a reduction. The general result would be, not

a diminution of charges, but an increase; and it is hardly prob-

able that the country at large would be satisfied witli the change,

* In Poor's Manual the aggregate cost of the railroads of this country and their

equipment to 1881, is given at $4,653,609,297. The railroad companies paid in

1880 in dividends, $77,115,410; and for interest on bonded debt, $107,866,328.

To 1882 the cost was $5,577,996,931. There was paid in 1881 in dividends,

$93,344,200, and for interest $128,587,302. It will be seen that the dividends

and interest together are about four per cent. on the cost of the roads and equip-

ment ; the dividends being much the smaller part. No doubt there is much

" watered " stock, and a large allowance may be made therefor, without affecting

the accuracy of the statement in the text.

And

New York, we are not satisfied that a strict application of the

ciple could be applied, we do not pee how the railroad companies

receive for the transportation service the cost of the service, as

It may be that New York westbound

were

attainable, could it be made _the standard whereby t o measure
the charges as between competi ng cities ?

We do not co nsider

now what might be j us t and right as between a railroad com pany
and its patrons if the case of any rai ll'Oad company could be
taken up and considered by i ts e l f apart fro m all oth ers, but of
what i s practicable i n view of ex isting facts.

If the cost prin·

ciple coul d be applit·d, we do not �ee how the railroad companies
of the country could j ustly complain of it.

If they could all

receive for the transporta ti on service the cost of the service,
above

as

e x pla i ne d , they would benefit their average condition

very greatl y by acceptin g it, for they are not now receiving
on an average anything near the a verage legal interest of the
cou ntry on the cost of their in vestme n ts. *

Many o f the com

pa n ies-perh ap s the majority of them-i n order to realize cost

would be compelled to i ncrease their c h a rges very considerably,
while others, including perhaps some of these Trunk Li nes, might
be called upon for a r eduction .
a

The genera l result would be, not ·

dimi nut ion of charges, but an increase ; and it is hardly prob

able that th e country at large. would be satisfied with the change,
* In Poor's Manual the aggregate cost of the railroads of this country l!-nd their

eq ui pme n t to 1 8 8 1 , i s given at $!, 653,609, 2 9 7 .

The railroad compan ies

pa i d

in

1 880 in dividends, $7 7 , 1 1 5 , 4 1 0 ; and for interest o n bonded debt, $ 1 0 7 , 866,328.
To 1882 the cost was $5, 5 7 7,996,93 1 .

There was paid in 1 8 8 1 in dividt1nds,

$93,344, 200, and for interest $ 1 2 8 , 5 8 7 , 3 0 2 .

It will . be seen that the dividends

and interest together are about four per cent. on the cost of the roads and equ i p
ment ; the dividends being much the smaller part.

No doubt there is much

" w atere d " s tock, and a large allowance may be made therefor, without alfecting

the accuracy of the statement in the text.
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though it might affect particular localities favorably. Moreover,

we are to consider that the question of the application of the

cost standard to railroad charges arises for discussion and settle-

ment after cities have been built, routes established, canals made

and railroads constructed; and that the solution of the question

may affect all these beneficially or otherwise to an extent that

is beyond present calculation. We have not an unsettled

country before us to plan and make laws for, whose people when

though it might affect particular localities favorably.

Moreover,

we are to consider that the question of the applicatio n of the
cost standard to railroad charges arises for discussion and settl e
ment after cities have been built, routes established, canals made

they select their homes and places of business can calculate the

result of existing rules and regulations upon the towns they

build, or the industries they establish; but the towns already

,exist, and have been created at immense cost in view of advan-

tages which were supposed to make them attractive and desirable

as locations for trade and commerce; and their existing import-

ance as the homes of great numbers of people, and as the centres

of vast manufactures and immense exchanges gives them claims

upon the country and upon those who have in any degree the

and railroads constructed ; and that the sol ution of the question
may affect all these beneficially or otherwise to an extent that
is beyond present calculation.

We have not an un settled

·country before us to plan and make laws for, whose people when
they select their homes and

places of business can calcu late

the

:resul t of existing rules and regulations upon the towns they
I

material interests of the country in charge, and gives them

build, or the industries they establish ; but the towns already

powers of defence also when assailed in the rivalry of business

which are not to be overlooked or lightly regarded.

These several towns, it is true, came into existence under cir-

·exist, and have been created at i m mense cost in view of advan
tages which were supposed to make them attractive and desirable

cumstances which may be different from those which now sur-
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round them ; and in view of advantages, which in mamr cases

have been rendered comparatively unimportant by subsequent

improvements and inventions—as canal and river navigation in

many parts of the country has been rendered unimportant by

the invention of the locomotive and the iron road—but the

towns themselves, their people and their business, remain as great

and sturdy facts, which neither the country can overlook, nor the

government of the country, nor any of its public agencies. The

continued existence of these towns is to be assumed, and their

welfare is to be calculated for when laws are made, or regula-

tions having the effect of laws are established. It would be as

inadmissible and as unjust deliberately to plan and arrange for

the gradual destruction of a great city through the slow but

certain annihilation of its business, as it would be to bring de-

struction upon it by fire or pestilence; and we are not to con-

template with complacency an offence of that nature against

as

locations for trade and com merce ; and their existing import·

ance as the homes of great numbers of people, and ns the centres
·of vast manufactures and immense exch anges gives them claims
upon the country and upon those who have i n any degree the
material interests of the country in charge, and gives them
powers o f defence also when assailed in the rival ry of b usiness
which are not to be overlooked or ligh tly regarded.
'l' hese several towns, it is true, came into existence under cir
cumstances which may be different from those which now sur
ro und them ; and in view of advantages, which i n many cases
have been rendered comparatively unim portant by subsequent
improvements and inventions-as canal and river navigation in
many parts of the country has been ren dered unim portant by
the invention of the locomotive and the iron road-but the
towns themselves, their people and their busi n ess, remain as great
and sturdy facts, which neither the cou ntry can overlook, nor th e
government of the country, nor any of its public agencies. The
continued existence of these towns i s to be assumed, and their
welfare is to be calculated for when laws are made, or regula
tions having the effect of laws are establish ed.

It would be as

inadmissible and as unjust del iberately to plan and arrange for
the gradual destruction of a great city t hrough the slow but
<:!ertain annihilation of its business, as it would be to bring de
struction upon it by fire or pestilence ; and we are not to con
�emplate with complacency an offence of that nature against

·

organized society. While it is not the province of government.

to build up cities for its people, it is its plain duty to permit the

26

cities the people build to live; and it should so shape its own.

action as to allow every town, as far as possible and reasonable,

to avail itself of all its natural and acquired advantages in add-

ing to the prosperity, happiness and comfort of the local com-

munity. This seems too plain and indisputable a proposition to-

be contested by any official authority or public agency.

In a certain sense railroad companies are public agencies, and

in some degree they exercise powers which are quasi govern-

mental. They make regulations for their business to which the

general public are expected to conform; and these regulations

organized society.

While it is n ot the province of government .

to build up cities for its peopl e, it is its plain duty to permit the·
cities the people build to live ; and it should so shape its own.
action as to allow every tow n, as far

as

possible and reasonable,

to avail itself of all its natural and acquired advantages in add-·
ing to the prosperity, happiness and comfort of the local com

are, in some respects, as important as the police laws established

by the State itself. Among these are the regulations respecting

charges for railroad service. According as these are heavy or

light upon the traffic of a particular locality, its trade is likely

to decline or prosper, and so dependent is commerce upon rail-

roads that the growth of a town is likely to bear some propor-

tion to the extent of its railroad facilities, and the liberality with

which it is treated by railroad managers.

We should consider then what might be the effect of a

strict application of the cost principle as between the competing.

Atlantic cities, say, for illustration, the cities of Baltimore and

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015020916527
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ISew York. Baltimore is now a large and prosperous city; it is

the chief business centre of a territory larger than any one of the

States, and millions of people find their business favored, and

their prosperity and comforts enhanced by its existence. One-

of the most costly roads of the country, with extensive connec-

tions and feeders, has been created with almost exclusive regard

to Baltimore business; and the road will prosper if the city

prospers, and lose its importance if the city decays. A great

number of private individuals and public and private corpora-

tions are interested in the stock and indebtedness of this rail-

road company, and would be subjected to embarrassment or

suffering if it were to be forced into bankruptcy. For all these-

reasons the welfare of Baltimore is a matter of national import-

ance, and it is so connected with the trade of the interior that its

existence modifies beneficially all the markets. But its relations-

mun ity.

This seems too plai n and indisputable

a

proposition to

be contested by any official auth ority or public agency.
In a certain sense railroad companies are public agencies, and
· in some degree they exercise powers which are quasi govern
mental.

They make regulations for their business to whi ch the

general public are expected to conform ; and these regulations.
are, in some respects, as important as the police laws established
by the State itseli

A mong these are the regulations respecti ng

charges for railroad service.

According as these a re heavy or ·

light u pon the traffic of a particular locality, its trade is likel_y
to decline or prosper, and so dependent is com merce upon rail-·
roads that the growth of a to w n is likely to bear some propor
tion to the extent of its railroad facilities, and the liberality with
which it is treated by railroad managers.
\V e should

consider then what might be the effect of

a

strict application of the cost principle as between the competing.
Atlantic cities, say, for illustration, the cities of Baltimore and
N ew York.

Baltimore is now a large and prosperous city ; it is

the chief business centre of a terri tory larger than any one of the·
States, and millions of people find their business favored, and
their prosperity and comforts enhanced by its existence.

One

of the most costly roads of the country, with extensive connec

tion s and feeders, has been created with al most exclusive regard
to Baltimore busi ness ; and th e road will prosper if the city
prospers, and lose its importance if the city decays.

A great.

n u mber of private individuals and public and private corpora
ti ons- are interested in the stock and indebtedness of this rail
road company, and would be subjected to embarrassment or·
suffe ring if it were to be forced into bankruptcy.

For all these

reasons the welfare of Baltimore is a matter of national imp ort



ance, and it is so connected with the trade of the interior that its
existence modifies beneficially all the markets.

But its relations.
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to the foreign trade are also such as to render it important to the

whole civilized world.

But New York has some most decided advantages over Balti-

more, of which its people have availed themselves with great

ability and energy. The growth of that city has not been checked

by the marvelous prosperity of other towns, and its relative

superiority in both foreign and domestic commerce has been

substantially maintained. Though Baltimore is much nearer

the grain fields of the West, New York still draws to itself much

the larger share of the harvests, and it has done this in spite of

the fact that, with temporary and unimportant exceptions, the

differential rates have at all times been largely against that city.

Suppose now that under an application of the cost principle the

differentials could be abrogated ; what would be the effect upon

Baltimore ? Would it deprive that city of the share in the trade

of the country, which its location, its great expenditures and the

skill and enterprise of its people have hitherto secured for it?

Would it check the growth of the city, sap its prosperity, and

to the foreign trade are also such

as

to render it important to the

whole civilized worl d.
But New York has some most decided advantages over Balti
more, of which its people have availed themselves with great
ability and energy.

The growth of that city b as not been c hec ked

by the marvelous prosperity of other towns, and its relative
superiority in both foreign and domestic commerce has been
substantia11y mai n tained.

Though Baltimore is much nearer

the grain fields of the West, New York Rtill draws to itself much
the larger share of the harvests, and it has done this in spite of
the fact that, with temporary and unimportant exceptions, the

bring ruin upon those everywhere whose business arrangements

and investments have been made with a view exclusively or

mainly to the trade of that city ? And if so, would the result

be one that the country could contemplate with satisfaction as
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the just result of the proper application of a sound principle, and

that those having influence in railroad affairs could justly and

properly plan for, labor for and shape their tariffs to accomplish ?

On the other hand, suppose the strict application of the cost

principle should be found to require that the differentials against

New York should be doubled; would it be admissible to double

them irrespective of all consequences to the trade and prosperity

of that city T That these consequences might prove disastrous

if the principle could be upheld and enforced, seems certain, for

it would give advantages to the town most favorably located for

cheap commercial intercourse for which the others could have

no compensation. But this very fact—if there were no other

impediment—would render the application of the principle im-

possible. A great city possesses great powers of self protection,

and it must exercise them to the fullest extent when the need

cornea Great railroad corporations cannot, in their rivalry with

differential rates have at all times been largely against that city.
Suppose now that under an application of the cost princi ple the
differentials could be abrogated ; what would be th e effect upon
Balti more ?

Would it depri ve that city of the share in the trade

of the country, which its location, its great expenditures and· the
skill and enterprise of its people have· h ith erto secured for i t ?
Would it check the growth of the city, sap its prosperity, and
bring ruin upon those everywhere whose business arrangements
and investments h ave been made with a view excl usively or
mainly to the trade of th at ci ty ?

And if so, would the result

be one that the cou ntry cou l d contemplate with satisfaction as
the j ust result of the proper application of

a

sound p rinc i p le , and

that those h aving influence in railroad affairs could j ustly and
properly plan for, labor for and shape their tariffs to accom plish '(
On the other hand, suppose the strict application of the c ost
principle should be found to require that the differentials agai nst
New York should be doubled ; would it be admissible to double
them irrespecti ve of all consequences to the trade and prosperity
of that

city 1'

That these consequences might prove disastrous

if the principle coul d be upheld and enforced, seems certain, for
it would give advantages to the town most favorably located for
cheap commercial intercourse for which the others could have
no compensation.

But this very fact-if there were no other

impediment-would render the application of the principle im
possible.

A great city possesses great powers of self p ro tectio n ,

and it must exercise them to the fullest extent when the need
comes.

Great railroad corporations cannot, in their rivalry with
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each other, accept principles of action which must necessarily

impoverish them. If the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad would lose

its business under the application of the cost principle as between

it and the roads north of it, it must accept less returns upon its

business, and it must continue the struggle even though no more

than operating expenses be realized, rather than submit to de-

struction without an effort at self preservation. This or some-

thing like it must be the inevitable result; for neither cities nor

transportation companies can or will accept a principle which it

can be seen in advance must build up some on the ruin of the

each other, accept principles of action which must necessarily
impoverish them. If th e Baltimore & Ohio Railroad would lose
its busi ness under the application of the cost principle as between
it and the roads north of it, it must accept less returns upon its
b usiness, and it must conti nue the struggle even though no more
than operati ng expenses be realized, rather than submit

others.

But when it comes to applying the cost principle to the

several lines which serve the same city, it is at once perceived

that the difficulties are insurmountable. The application must

of course be made on estimates of probable results, and the

estimates will have in view a percentage of profits which it is

expected or hoped will be realized. But with four or more lines

of very different length competing for the same business, it is

to

de

This or some

struction without an effort at self preservation.

thing l i ke it m ust be the inevitable result ; for neither cities nor
transportation companies can or will accept a principl e which it
can be seen in advance must b uild up some on the ruin o f the
others.

evident that cost must have, when applied to their business, very

But when it comes to applying the cost principle to the

different meanings. If the shortest and cheapest line makes its

charges on a calculation of say ten per cent profit, the longest

and most expensive must conform to the charges, even though
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they be such as will insure no profit at all. One company may

then carry at a cost which includes ten per cent. profit, another

at a cost which includes say two per cent. profit, while a third

barely pays its operating expenses and repairs, but still obtains

the cost of moving the freight. Competition obliges the com-

panies to take what they can get, and to satisfy the demands up-

several lines which serve the same city, it is at once perceived
that the difficul ties are insurmo u n table.

The application m ust

of course be made on estimates of probable results, and the
estimates will have in view a percentage of profits which it is
expected or hoped will be realized.

But with four or more lines

of very different length competing for the sarne business, it is

on them from it; but when the cost standard is so uncertain and

elastic that it may include profits when they can be earned, and

must exclude them when they cannot be, it is evident that it can-

not be a standard of general or just application. It is impossible

that anything can be a governing principle, which, in the nature

of things, cannot have the same meaning to the several parties

who are to be affected by its application.

That the cost to the roads themselves of moving their freights,

irrespective of profits to shareholders, has much to do in deter-

mining the charges is, we think, unquestionable. It certainly

evident that cost m ust have, when applied to their b usiness, very
different meani ngs.

If the shortest and cheapest line makes its

cha rges on a cal cul ation of say ten per cent. profit, the longest
and most expen sive must conform to the charges, even though
they be such as will i nsure no profit at all.

One com pany may

then carry at a cost wh ich includes ten per cen t. profit, another
at a cost which incl udes say two per cent profit, while a third
barely pays its operati ng expenses and repairs, but still obtains
the cost of moving th e freight.

Competition obliges the com

panies to take what they can get, and to satisfy the demands up
on them fro m it ; but when the cost standard is so uncertain and
elastic that it may include profits when they can be earned, and
m ust exclude them when they cannot be, it is evident that it can
not be a standard of general or just application.

It is impossible

that anythi ng can be a governing principle, which, in the natUre
of thi ngs, cannot have the same meaning to the several parties
who are to be affected by its application.
.

That the cost to the roads themselves of moving their freights,

irrespecti ve of profits to shareholders, has much to do in deter
mining the cha rges is, we think, unquestionable.

It certainly.

must have influence so long as competition between lines exists,

29

for the most economical line may fix rates on a consideration of ,

what its favorable circumstances will enable it to endure, and

all others must accept them whether they prove satisfactory or

otherwise. One cheap line may thus give to a town the benefits

of cheap transportation, not as an application of the cost prin-

ciple, bat because its favorable circumstances enable it to do so

consistent with its own interests.

The idea was not put forward in any of the arguments that

the application of the cost principle could be made universal,

and that every railroad company should apply it in its own busi-

ness as between the different kinds and classes of freight. The

difficulty in doing this as a mere matter of accounting would be

very serious ; but there would be other difficulties which would

be more important to the general public. The chief of these

would be this : that very many articles would not bear transpor-

tation for the very considerable distances for which they are now

carried, if the charges upon them were graded strictly by the

cost. If their bulk or weight is large in proportion to their value,

they must be carried cheaply or they cannot be carried at all; and

freights are therefore classified in the tariffs so that the lighter,

but more valuable, articles are made to bear a burden out of pro-

portion to the cost of carriage, in order that the roads which
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carry them may be enabled at the same time to serve the public

in the exchange of articles and products whose value will not

admit of like charges. Some discriminations of this sort are

essential to enable railroads to answer the expectations and meet

the needs of the public. It must often happen, also, that where

two or more roads are competing for a particular business, one

of them must carry what it gets of it without profit, and must

find its profit elsewhere. If the competition under such circum-

stances leads to the road carrying one kind of traffic at a loss,

which is made up by an increase of burdens on the remainder,

must have i nfluence so long

as

competition between l i nes exists,

for the most economical line may fix rates on a consideration of ·

w hat its favorable circumstances will enable it to endure, and
all others must accept them whether they prove satisfactory or
otherwise.

One cheap li n e m ay thus give to a town th e benefits

of cheap transportation, not as an ap plica tion of the cost prin
ciple, but because its favorable circumstances enable it to do so
consistent with its o w n i nterests.
The idea was not put forward in any of the arguments that
the application of the cost principle could be made universal,
and that every railroad company should apply it in its own busi
ness as between the different kinds and classes of freight.

The

difficulty i n doing this as a mere matter of accounting would be
very serious ; but there would be other difficulties wh ich wo uld
be more important to the ge n eral public.

The chief of these

would be this : that very many articles would not bear transpor
tation for the very considerable distances for which they are now
carri ed, if the ch a rges upon them were graded strictly by the
cost.

If their bulk or weight is large in proportion to their val ue,

they must be carr ied cheaply or they can not be carried at al l ; and
freights are therefore classified in the tariffs so th at the lighter,

a wrong is done of which complaint may justly be made ; but

there is no inherent wrong to any one in a road conveying with-

out profit, but also without loss, a business which it must accept

on those terms or decline altogether.

but more valuable, articles are made to bear a b urden out of pro
portion to the cost of c arr iage, in order that the roads which
carry them may be enabled at the same time to serve the p ublic
in the exch ange of articles an d products wh ose value will not
admit of like charges.

S(lme discriminations of this sort are

essen tial to enable rai l roads to answer the expectations and meet
the needs of the public.

It m ust often happen, also, that where

two or more roads are com peti ng for a p arti cular business, one
of th em must carry what it gets of it w ithout profit, and m ust
find its profit elsewhere.

If the com peti tion under such circum

stances leads to the road car rying one kind of traffic at a loss,
which is made up by an increase of b u rd en s on the remai nder,
a wrong is done of which complaint may j ustly be made ; but
t h ere is no i n h erent wrong to any one in a road conveying wi•h·
out profit, but also without loss, a business which i t must accept

on those term s or decline altogether.
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THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION.

If neither distance nor cost gives us the governing principle,

we must next see whether we are to find it in competition. In

THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION.

nearly every other kind of business the competition of those

engaged in it is the great regulator of charges, and the opera-

If n eit h er distance nor cost gives us the governing principle,

tion of natural and familiar laws of trade prevents extortion

and brings about substantial uniformity. Will competition do

this in the business of transporting property by rail ? If so, is

not the competitive principle the true principle? And will not

the competitive principle make cost and distance elements in

the determination of rates, and allow to each its just value, ac-

we must ne x t see wh ether we are to find it in competi tion.

In

nearly e v ery other kind of business the competition of those

engaged in it is the great regulator of charges, and the opera·
tion of natural and familiar laws of

trade prevents

extortion

cording to the circumstances ?

We should be glad to feel able to give to these questions an

unhesitating answer in the affirmative. We have found, how-

ever, in the course of our investigations, that a species of com-

petition has prevailed from time to time which has brought

satisfaction to few persons, if any, and which has resulted in

inequalities and disorders greatly detrimental to trade. Such

competition exists when the railroad companies, or those who

are permitted to solicit business and to make contracts on their

11.nd brings about substantial uniformity.

not th e com petitive pri nciple the true principle ?
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regardless of gain or loss; and when acting upon this determi-

nation they throw to the winds all settled rates, and in the

desperate strife for business offer any inducement in their power

which will secure it. The country not long since had experi-

ence of such a season, and everywhere we listened to complaints

of the injury which legitimate business suffered from it It

was said by parties interested in transportation that the inaugu-

ration of such a strife put an end for the time to all possibility

of calculating from day to day what would be the cost of car-

riage, and what could be safely paid or wisely accepted for

gram, provisions, or other articles, destined to another market

by rail. The control of railroad rates, and, to a large extent,

of all railroad business, then passed out of the hands of the

legitimate and regular corporate managers into the hands of

solicitors for fast freight lines and other agents, who made from

If so, is

And will not

the com petitive prin0iple make cost and distance elements in
the determination of rates, and a1 low to each its j ust val ue, ac
cording to the circumstances ?
We· should be glad to feel able to giv e to these questions an

behalf, set out with the determination to withdraw freights from

their rivals, and secure them for themselves, at all hazards, and

Will competition do

this in the business of transporting property by rai l ?

unhesitating answer in the affirmative.

We have found, how

ever, in the course of our i n v estigations, that a species of com
petition has prevailed from ti me to time which has brought
satisfaction to few persons, if any, and which has resulted in
i nequal ities and disorders greatly detrimental to trade.

Such

co m p e tition exists when th e railroad companies, or those who
are permitted to solicit business and to make contracts on thei r
behalf, set out with the determi nation to withd raw freigh ts from
their ri vals, and sec ure them for themselves, at al l hazards, and
regardless of gain

or

losR ; and when acting upon this determi

n ation th ey throw to the winds all settled

rates,

and in the

desperate strife for business offer ·any inducement in th eir po w e r
which w i l l sec ure it.

The country not long since had experi

and every wh ere we li stened to complaints
of the . injury which legitimate business suffered from it.
It
ence of such

a s eas on,

was sai d b_y parti es interested i n transportation that the inaugu
ration of such a strife put an end for the time to all possibil i ty
of calculat i ng from day to day what would be the cost of car
riage, and what could be safely paid or wi sely accepted for
gra i n , provisions, or other articles, destined
by rai l.

of

'!' be con trol of

rai l road

to another

market

rates, and, to a large exte nt,

all railroad business, then passed out of the h ands of the

legi timate and regular corporate managers into the hands of
sol icitors for fast freight lines and oth e r agenti., who made from
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.day to day, and from hour to hour, such terms with those hav-

31

ing business as would secure it, but generally made secret

-terms—that the bargain with one man might not prevent their

driving a better bargain with another, as they might find oppor-

tunity. Under such circumstances persons were favored and

localities were favored, when the object to be immediately ac-

.complished seemed to require it—regardless of the just maxims

of legitimate business, and of the rules of the common law,

which enjoin upon common carriers that they shall deal with all

-customers upon principles of equity and relative fairness. Le-

gitimate business, it was said, necessarily passes into an un-

settled and speculative state while this condition of things ex-

ists ; safe and close calculations are impossible; transportation

becomes cheap, but neither producer nor consumer is certain to

reap the profit, for the middleman cannot calculate upon steadi-

ness in low rates, and as he takes the risk of their being raised

upon him, so he is in the best position to appropriate the benefit

while they continue. Meantime, railroad profits disappear, and

,dividends cease to be paid, to the great distress of thousands

who rely upon them for their living; and every interest, in any

degree dependent on railroad prosperity, must participate in

the depression and disaster which accompanies the ownership
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.of railroad shares.

The mere statement of these results is sufficient to show that

this is not what in other business is known and designated

as competition. Competition is the life of trade, but this is its

destruction; competition brings health and vigor, and secures

equality and fairness, but this paralyzes strength, and makes

,contracts a matter of secrecy and double dealing. In competi-

tion, the sound dealer, operating upon his own capital and upon

•well established credit, has the best chance of success ; but in

the sort of competition we have mentioned, it is found that the

Tjankrupt corporation has the advantage, for its managers, hav-

ing nothing to lose, may offer rates which solvent roads cannot

meet without being dragged into bankruptcy with them. Kail-

road managers do not concede that this state of things is prop-

erly designated competition, but they speak of it as an unnat-

ural condition of railroad hostility; as unreasoning railroad

-day to day, and from hour to hour, such terms with those hav
ing business as would secure it, but generally made secret
-terms-that the bargain with one ma n might not prevent the ir
dri vi ng a better bargain with another, as they might find oppor
-tunity. Under such circumstances persons were favored an d
localities were favored, when the object to be immediately ac
·com p 1 i shed seemed to requi re it-regardless of the just maxi ms
of legitimate business, and of the rules of the common law,
which enjoin upon common carriers that they shall deal with all
-customers upon principles of equity and relative fairness. Le-gitimate business, it was said , necessarily pa�ses into an u n settled and speculative state while this condition of thi ngs ex
ists ; safe and close calculations are impossible ; transportation
becomes cheap, but neither producer nor consumer is certain to
reap the profit, for the midd le m an cannot calculate upon steadi
•n es s in low rates, an d as h e takes the risk of their being raised
upon him, so he is i n the best position to app ropria te the benefit
while they continue. Meantime, railroad profits disappear, and
· d ivi dend s cease to be paid, to the great distress of tho u sa n ds
who rely upon them for their living ; and every interest, in any
degree d e pend ent on railroad prosperity, must pa rticipa te in
the depression and disaster which accompanies the ownership
-0f railroad shares.
The mere statement of these results is sufficient to show that
this is not what in other business is k no w n and designated
.as competition. Competition is the life of trade, but this is its
destruction ; competition brings health and vigor, a n d secures
equality and fairness, but this paraly zes strength, and makes
· contracts a matter of secrecy and double dealing. In competi
tion, the sound dealer, operating upon his own capital and upon
well established credi t, has the best chance of success ; but i n
the sort of competition we have menti on ed , it is found that the
oankrupt corporation has the advantage, for its managers, hav
ing noth i ng to lose, may offer rates which solvent roads cannot
meet without being dragged into bankruptcy with them. Rail
road managers do not concede that this state of things is prop·
�rly d esign ated com petition, but they speak of it as an unnat
ural condition of railroad hosti li ty ; as un reasoning railroad
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warfare; as competitive strife, rather than competition. It is a

state of things that, like a war between nations, from its very

destructiveness, cannot be a normal condition, but must speedily

terminate in peace or in disaster. It has usually been termin-

ated by some common understanding between railroad mana-

gers upon a tariff of rates.

warfare ; as competitive strife, rather than competition.
state of things that, like

a

It is

a

war between nations, from its very

destructiveness, cannot be a normal condition, b u t m ust speedily

But this common understanding, it is urged, in some quarters,

eliminates competition from the sphere of railroad business, and

we escape the evils of competitive strife by embracing those of

monopoly. This is denied by railroad managers, who insist

that understandings respecting the reasonable management of

their business are not only entirely consistent with competition,

but that they are the only means whereby the excessive com-

petition at some points can be prevented from operating oppres-

sively at others. It is no doubt true that competition tends to

produce some great inequalities, and that care ought to be taken

to prevent this. It should never be forgotten that the trans-

portation of property and persons by railroad is not exclusively

a private business, but is carried on under franchises granted by

the State, which confer upon the owners functions of a .semi-

public nature, and charge them with certain public duties.

The railroad manager, operating under such a franchise, must
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harmonize the interest of his road with the public duty, and he

cannot make self interest the exclusive guide, as a merchant

may, or a farmer. One of the chief of these public duties is to

make only reasonable charges, and to regulate and apportion

these among the customers of the road, on principles of equity

and relative equality. But the operation of competition is per-

petually in conflict with this duty; it is felt unequally along

railroad lines; it will be active at points where several lines can

compete; it will be moderate at others where there is little to

excite it, while at still others there can be no competition, be-

cause there is but a single road. But the capital of a railroad

terminate in peace or in disaster.

It has usually been termin

ated by some com mon understanding between railroad mana
gers upon a tariff of rates.
But this common understanding, it is urged, in some quarterst
eliminates competition from the sphere of railroad business, and
we escape the evils of competitive strife by embracing those of
monopoly.

This is denied by railroad managers, who insist

that understandings respecting the reasonable management of
thei r business are not only entirely consi stent with competitiont
but that they are the only means whereby the excessive com
petition at some points can be prevented from operating oppres 
sively at others.

It is no doubt true that competition tends to

prod uce some great inequal ities, and that care ought to be taken
to prevent this.

It should never be forgotten that the trans

portation of property and persons by railroad is not exclusively
a pri vate busin ess, but is carried on u nder franchises granted by
the State, wh ich confer upon the owners functions of a .semi
p ublic nature, and charge them with certai n p ublic duties.
The rai lroad manager, operating un der such a franchise, must

company is planted on a certain line; it must be made available

to its owners there or nowhere; it cannot be removed when

found unprofitable, as a merchant may remove his stock of

goods; and the tendency of excessive competition is to cast

upon the business of non-competing points a cost for transpor-

harmonize the interest of his road with the public d u ty, and be
cannot make self interest the excl usive guide, as a merchant
may, or a farmer.

One of the chief of these public duties is to

mak e only reasonable charges, and to regul ate and apportion
t hese among the customers of the road, on principles of equity
and rel ative equality.

But the operation of competition is per

petua lly in conflict w ith this duty ; it is felt unequally along
railroad lin es ; it will be active at points where several lines can
compete ; it will be moderate at others where there is little to
excite it, while at stil l oth ers there can be no competition, be
cause there is but a single road.

But the capital of a rail road
company is planted on a certain line ; it m ust be made available

to its owners there or n o where ; it cannot be removed when
found unprofitable, as a merchant may remove his stock of
goods ; and the tendency of excessive competition is to cast.
u pon the business of non-competing points a cost for transpor-
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tation which puts them to great relative disadvantage, and in

extreme cases may prove ruinous. The local traffic is likely to

experience this result most severely, and the more completely

any particular line occupies a territory, the more is the local

traffic exposed to peril. The New York Central Eailroad with

no connections west of Buffalo, would be a mere local road, and

must find remunerative returns upon all its immense invest-

ments from the local business; as a great through line, it is en-

abled to cast upon through traffic a part of the burden which

local traffic must otherwise bear; but if under the stress of un-

reasonable and excessive strife for through freights that class of

freights is carried at a loss, this loss must either fall upon the

corporate shareholders, or it must be cast by the corporation

upon the shippers of local freights. It must be assumed that

railroad boards will always seek to 'so arrange their tariffs of

rates as to secure a satisfactory net profit; and if a part of the

business pays too little, the remainder may be made to pay too

much. This is not a beneficial result of competition, or one

consistent with the obligations of the railroad companies to the

public. No one disputes or doubts that for the general public

the business of transportation by rail is in the most desirable

state when it is so conducted that the charges for moving prop-
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erty are distributed with relative equality over all the business,

so that a moderate profit may be reaped from all, and the sup-

port of the road, and profits to its owners, not be exacted wholly

or mainly from one portion of the business to the exemption of

the remainder. But it is only when it is in that state that rail-

road companies are complying with their common law obliga-

tion as carriers. If they are sacrificing the interests of one class

tation which puts them to great rel ative disadvantage, and in
The local traffic is likely to

extreme cases may prove ruinous.

experience this result most severely,

and the more completely

any particular line occupies a territory, the more is the local
traffic exposed to peril

.

The New York Central Railroad with

no connections west of Buffalo, would be a mere local road, and
must find remunerative returns upon all its immense invest
ments from the local business ; as a great through line, it is

en

abled to cast upon thro ugh traffic a part of the burden which
local traffic must otherwise bear ; but if under the stress of un
reasonable and excessive strife for through freights that class· of
freights is carried at a loss, this loss must either fall upon the
corporate shareholders, or it must be cast by the corporation
upon the shippers of local freights.

It

m ust

be assumed that

railroad boards will always seek to ·so arrange their tariffs of
rates as to secure a satisfactory net profit ; and if a part of th e
business pays too little, the remainder may be made to pay too
much.

This is not a beneficial result of competition, or one

consistent with the obligations of the railroad co m panie s to the

of shippers in the reckless strife to obtain the business of an-

other. it is plain that they cannot be dealing impartially or

making charges which are relatively just And certainly no

city can be interested in having the trade which is nearest to it,

and which is the trade of the people constituting its best and

largest customers, sacrificed to the trade with the people at a

distance, who deal with it much less.

It is a fact of which the railroad companies are entitled to

the full benefit, that the charges for railroad service have

public.

No one disputes or doubts that for the general public

the business of transportation by rail is in the most desirable
state when it is so conducted that the charges for moving prop
erty are distributed with relative equality over all the business,
so that a moderate profit may be reaped from all, and the sup
port of the road, and profits to its o w ners, not be exacted wholly
or mainly from one portion of the business to the exemption of
the remainder.

But it is only when it is in that state that rail

road companies are complying with their common law obliga
tion as carriers.

If they are sacrificing the interests of one class

of shippers in the reckless strife

to

obtain the business of an 

other, it is plain that they cannot be dealing impartially or
making charges which are relatively just.

And certai nly no

city can be interested in havi ng the trade which is nearest to it,
and which is the t rade of the people constituting its best and
largest customers, sacrificed to the trade with the people at a
distance, who deal with it m uch less.
It is a fact of which the railroad cumpanies are entitled tc,
the full benefit, that the charges for railroad service have

·
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steadily declined, even when the railroads have been so con-

34

ducted as to avoid competitive strife. Mr. Poor, in his sum-

mary of railroad operations for the year 1881, prepared for his

Manual, gives some striking figures on the subject of rates,

and shows that within a quarter of a century, the average

charges for the transportation of property on three of the

great railroad lines of the country have been reduced more

than seventy per cent., and that the reduction has continued

to go on until the present day.* Some of the reasons for

the reduction are traceable to competition and some not. The

growth of railroad business has kept pace with the reduction

of the charges upon transportation, and the two have acted

and reacted upon each other as cause and effect. When the

merchandise or products of one section of the country, for

which there was a demand in another, would not bear trans-

portation at existing rates, the railroads have been compelled

to reduce the rates as a necessary condition to obtaining the

property for carriage ; and the reductions which are made in

* " The internal commerce of the country, in all its vast magnitude, is a direct

creation of our railroads, through the reduction they have effected in the

cost of transportation. A good example of their method, and of its results, is

afforded by the operations of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad.
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In 1856, immediately after its consolidation, this road moved 670,073 tons ot

freight at a charge of $3,758,320, and at a cost of $1,539,912 ; the net being

$2,215,408. The tons moved one mile equalled 114,827,793; the charge was

3.270 cents ; the cost, 1.341 cents ; the net, 1.929 cents per ton per mile.

"In 1881 the same road moved 11,591,379 tons of freight at a charge of

$20,736,750, and at a cost of $14,913,213 ; the net being $5,823,537. The number

of tons moved one mile equalled 2,646,814,098; the charge was .780 cents; the

steadily declined, even when the railroads have been so con
ducted as to avoid competitive strife.

mary of railroad operations for the year 1881, prepared for his
Manual, gives some striking figures on the subject of rates,
and shows that within

quarter of a century, the average

great railroad lines of the country have been reduced more
than seventy per cent. , and that the reduction has continued
to go on until the present day.*

Some of the reasons for

the reduction are traceable to competition and some not.

The

growth of railroad business has kept pace with the reduction
of the charges upon transportation, and the two have acted
and reacted upon each other as cause and effect.

When the

merchandise or products of one section of the country, for
which there was a demand in another, would not bear trans
portation at existing rates, the railroads have been compelled
to reduce the rates as a necessary condition to obtaining the

property for carriage ; and the reductions which are made in
----- .

* 11

"At the rate of 1855, the charge for moving a ton of wheat from Chicago to

charge for the latter year for this kind. of freight did not probably exceed $4 the

a

charges for the transportation of property on three of the

cost, .562 cents; the net, .218 cents per ton per mile.

New York, a distance of 960 miles, was $31.39; in 1881, $7.51. The actual

Mr. Poor, in his sum

·- - ·---· . ·-- -··-· ·-----

The internal commerce of the country, i n all its vast magnitude, is a direct

creation of

o

our railroads,

c st of transportation.

through the

reduction

they have effected in the

A good e xa mpl e of thefr method, and of its resul ts, is

ton—the charge for freight in bulk on the long haul being much below the gen-

eral average. It is certain that each year the railroad charged the freight traffic

over it all it would bear. It had to meet a most vigorous competition from every

quarter. It had to meet the exigency of the farmers of the extreme West, so

that the wheat grower, first on the Mississippi River and then on the Missouri,

nearly 2,000 miles in the interior, could send, at remunerative rates, his produce

to market, foreign as well as domestic. Charges for transportation had to be, as

they always must be, in inverse ratio to distance, or a limit would soon be reached

·afforded by the operations of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad.
In 1 85 5 , immediately after its consolidation, this road moved 6 7 0, 0 7 3 tons of

freigh t at

a charge of $3, 7 5 8 , 32 0, and at a cost of $ 1 , 53 9 , 9 1 2 ; the net being

$2,215,408.

The tons moved one mile equalled 1 14,82 7 , 7 9 3 ; the charge was

3 . 2 7 0 cents ; the cost, 1.341 cents ; the net, 1 .9 2 9 cents per ton per mile.

" In 1 8 8 1 the same road moved 1 1 , 5 9 1 , 3 7 9 tons of freight at a charge of
$20, 736, 7 50, and at a cost of $14,913,j? I B ; the net being $5, 823, 5 3 7 .

beyond which freight, from excessive cost, could not be moved. It is with rail-

of tons m o ved one mile equalled 2 , 64 6 , 8 1 4,098 ; the charge

was
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.780
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cost, .562 cents ; the net, . 2 1 8 cents per ton per mile.
11
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k
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some cases from necessity are made in others from policy,

because it is found that they stimulate industry, build up

manufactures, and bring profits to the railroad companies in

the great increase of business which is thereby prepared for

them. In all these cases the common interest of railroad

companies requires that they should yield to any public de-

mand for the reduction of rates so long and so rapidly as they

find they can do so with justice to their shareholders; and

they have generally found that the net results were such as

from a selfish standpoint would fully justify the reductions.

Common understandings between railroad companies.in many

such cases might tend to equalize and steady the rates, but

would be grossly impolitic and unreasonable if they were

directed to the maintenance of such freight charges as would

operate as a check upon transportation, and thereby reduce

their own net revenues.

But there are influences bearing upon the charges for the

transportation of property which are beyond the reach of the

railroad companies altogether, and which no combination

roads as with all other kinds of business, the charges and prices must be so gradu-

ated as to allow a profit on both sides, and they will always be so graduated.

Charges have been reduced to rates that were believed to be impossible a few
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years ago. In 1872 it cost the New York Central 1.129 cents to move a ton of

freight one mile. In 1881 it received only .783 cents for a similar service, or

.346 cents less than the cost ten years before. Such is the history of railroad

transportation, and such the methods by which the enormous tonnage, and with

it the internal commerce of the country, now so colossal in its proportions, has

been created. In its reduction of charges the Central Railroad only represents

the entire system of the country. The New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad,

some cases from necessity are made in others from policy,
because it is found that they stimulate industry, build up
manufactures, and bring profits to the railroad companies in
the great increase of business which is thereby prepared for
them.

In all these cases the common interest of railroad

companies requires that they should yield to any public de
mand for the reduction of rates so. Jong and so rapidly as they
find they can do so with justice to their shareholders ; and
th ey have generally found that the net results were such

as

from a selfish standpoint would fully justify the reductions.
Common understandings between railroad companies .in many
such cases might tend to equalize and steady the rates, but
would be grossly impolitic and unreasonable if they were
directed to the maintenance of such freight charges as would
operate as a check upon transportation, and thereby reduce
their own net revenues.
But there are influences bearing upon the charges for the
transportation of property which are beyond the reach of the
railroad companies altogether, and which no combination

in 1855, moved 842,055 tons of freight at a charge of 2.424 cents, and at a cost of

1.155 cents per ton per mile. In 1881 it moved 11,086,823 tons at a charge of

.805 cents, and at a cost of .529 cents per ton per mile. Had it charged as much

per mile in 1881 as it did in 1855, its receipts from freight would have been $47,-

101,811, in place of $5,473,313, the amount actually received. The Pennsylvania

Railroad moved, in 1855, 365,006 tons of freight at a charge of 2.746 cents, and

roads as with all other kinds of business, the charges and prices must be so gradu
ated as to allow a profit on both sides, and they will always be so graduated.

Charges have been reduced to rates that were believed to be impossible a few

years ago.

In 1 8 7 2 iL cost the New York Central 1 . 1 2 9 cents to move a ton of

at a cost of 1.662 cents per ton per mile. In 1881 it moved 18,229,365 tons at a

charge of .799 cents, and at a cost of .437 cents per ton per mile. Had it charged

the same rates in 1881 that it did in 1855, its receipts for the past year would

have been $73,195,832, in place of $10,801,089, the amount actually received.

The charge in 1881 was .87 cents less than the cost of movement in 1872. The

result of reduced charges is seen in the enormous increase of freight and of in-

come—quantity making up for reduced rate of profits."

In 1 8 8 1 it reoeived only . 783 cents for a similar service, or

freight one mile.

,346 cents leas than the cost ten years before.

Such is the history of railroad

transportation, and such the methods by which the en ormous tonnage, and with
it the internal commerce of the country, now so colossal i n its proportions, has
been created.

In its reduction of charges the Central Railroad only represents

the entire system of the country.

The New York, Lake Erie & We s ter n Railroad,

in 1855, moved 842 , 0 5 5 tons of freight at a charge of 2 .424 cents, and at a cost of
1 . 1 5 5 cents per ton per mile.

In 1 8 8 1 it moved l l , 086,823 ton s at a charge of

.805 cents, and at a cost of . 5 2 9 cents per ton per mile.
per mile in 1 8 8 1

as

Had it charged as much

it did in 1 8 5 5 , its receipts from freight would have been $47 ,-

1 0 1 , 8 1 1 , in place of $5,47 3 , 3 1 3, the amount actually received.

The Pennsylvania

Railroad moved, in 1 8 55, 365,006 tons of freight at a charge of 2.746 cents, and

at a cost of 1 . 662 cents per ton per mile.

In 1 8 8 1 it moved 1 8, 2 29, 365 tons at a

charge of . 7 9 9 cents, and at a cost of . 4 3 7 cents per ton per mile.

Had it charged

the same rates in 1 8 8 1 th at it did in 1855, its receipts for the past year would
have been $73, 1 95,832, in pllice of $ 1 0 , 8 0 1 ,089, the amount actually received.
The charge in 1 8 8 1 waR .87 cents less than the cost of movement in 1 8 7 2.

The

result of reduced charges is seen in the enormous increase of freight and or in
come-quantity making up for reduced rate of profits. "

·
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among them can control. The transportation of the products

and merchandise which the different sections of the country

exchange with each other is only in part in railroad hands,

and the carriers by rail are at all times subjected to a com-

petition which is not only active and vigilant, but is possessed

of some most important advantages. It will readily be in-

ferred that we allude here to the carriers by water. For the

whole distance from Chicago to New York the owners of

boats on lake and canal are bidding against the railroads for

freights. Much of the time they are offering rates which the

railroads -cannot meet without loss, and during the season of

water carriage they would take away from the railroads nearly

all the heavy freights, if it were not that the more rapid

transit by rail has some advantages of which shippers find

it for their interest in many cases to avail themselves. But

even with these advantages the railroads find themselves

compelled to make their charges approximate the charges of

carriage by water, or the great bulk of heavy freights will

inevitably take the water route. Thus the competition by

water operates in reduction of railroad tariffs, and no under-

standing among railroad managers can prevent it. When the

Erie canal is closed for the winter the railroad companies are
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enabled to advance their charges ; but even in the winter

they feel the competition of the water route ; for excessive

charges will not be paid, but grain, flour, provisions and

other heavy articles, instead of going forward by rail at what

seem to shippers extortionate rates, will be placed in store

until the water route is again open. Nor is the competition

with the water route felt exclusively by the roads to New

York; for unless the seaports to the south afford better mar-

kets for western products than is found at New York, which

they seldom or never do, the roads leading to them will be

cut off from carrying these products if their charges are

made to exceed the charges to New York. The favorable in-

fluence of the water route upon rates is therefore felt all the

way to the Ohio and the Potomac, and the maximum of rates

is fixed for all the roads by the roads to New York, with

which the water route comes most directly and immediately

into competition.

among them can control. The transportation of the products
and merchandise which the different sections of the country
exchange with each other is only in part in railroad hands,
and the carriers by rail are at all times subjected to a com
petition which is not only active and vigilant, but is possessed
of some most important advantages.

It will readily be in

ferred that we allude here to the carriers by water.

For the

whole distance from Chicago to New York the owners of
boats on lake and canal are bidding against the railroads for
freights.

Much of the time they are offering rates which the

railroads ·cannot meet without loss, and during the season of
water carriage they would take away from the railroads nearly
all the heavy freights, if it were not that the more rapid
transit by rail has some advantages of which shippers find
it for their interest in many cases to avail themselves.

But

even with these advantages the railroads find themselves
compelled to make their charges approximate the charges of
carriage by water, or the great bulk of heavy freights will
inevitably take the water route.

Thus the competition by

water operates in reduction of railroad tariffs, and no under
standing among railroad managers can prevent it. When the
Erie canal is closed for the winter the railroad companies are
enabled to advance their charges ; but even in the w inter
they feel the competition of the water route ; for excessive
charges will not be paid, but grain, flour, provisions and
other heavy arti6les, instead of going forward by rail at what
seem to shippers extortionate rates, will be placed in store
until the water route is again open.

Nor is the competition
with the water route felt exclusively by the roads to New

York ; for unless the seaports to the south afford better mar
kets for western products than is found at New York, which
they seldom or never do, the roads leading to them will be
cut off from carrying these products if their charges are
inade to exceed the charges to New York.

The favorable in

fluence of the water route upon rates is therefore felt all the
way to the Ohio and the Potomac, and the maximum of rates
is fixed for all the roads by the roads to New York, with
which the water route comes most directly and immediately
into competition.
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Under the competitive principle, a maximum of rates is

thus established, and the railroad companies cannot prevent

it, whatever may be their desire. But distance, cost, and

many other circumstances may then come in to force still

lower rates on the lines to the cities south of New York. If

it is found that the roads leading to Baltimore will not obtain

a reasonable share in the business without offering better

rates than are given to New York, such rates will certainly be

offered. They will submit to the rates which give the busi-

ness to other cities only until the trial proves the prejudicial

operation. And when they reduce their charges, it will be

optional to the New York roads to follow the Baltimore lead,

and they may no doubt be relied upon to do so if their inter-

ests appear to require it.

But another most important factor in regulating freight

charges is the export trade.

The prices of the leading American products, in the car-

riage of which the railroads compete most actively, are fixed

in European markets. These products should net to the pro-

ducer in the American market the foreign price, less reason-

able charges for transportation and handling; and he is in-

terested in having the trade open to the competition of as
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many buyers, and the transportation to that of as many car-

riers as possible. Of the Atlantic cities which compete for

this trade Baltimore and Philadelphia are nearest to the pro-

ducer, but New York and Boston are nearest to the foreign

market. Much is shipped to each of these cities for home

consumption, but the major part of all that they receive is

destined to a foreign market. Some of it passes from Western

towns on through bills of lading to foreign ports, but the

most of it is consigned to the merchants of the Atlantic cities,

and is reshipped by them. Except at Boston, it has been

found impracticable to distinguish between that intended for

home consumption and that for foreign shipment; and, there-

fore, no discrimination in freight charges is attempted, but

all is charged as if destined to a foreign market. But when

so treated, the Atlantic cities become merely so many points

on so many through routes between the interior of the country

Under the competitive principle, a maximum of rates is
thus established, and the railroad companies cannot prevent
it, whatever may be their desire.

But distance, cost, and

many other circumstances may then come in to force still
lower rates on the lines to the cities south of New York.

If

it is found that the roads leading to Baltimore will not obtain
a reasonable share in the business without offering better
rates than are given to New York, such rates will certainly be
offered.

They will submit to the rates which give the busi

ness to other cities only until the trial proves the prejudicial
operation.

And when they reduce their charges, it will be

optional' to the New York roads to follow the Baltimore lead,
and they may no doubt be relied upon to do so if their inter
ests appear to require it.
But anothe1· most important factor in regulating freight
charges is the export trade.
The prices of the leading American products, in the car
riage of which the railroads compete most active ly, are fixed
in European markets.

These products should net to the pro

ducer in the American market the foreign price, less reason
able charges for transportation and handling; and he is in
terested in having the trade open to the competition of as
many buyers, and the transportation to that of as many car
riers as possible.

Of the Atlantic cities which compete for

this trade Baltimore and Philadelpliia are nearest to the pro
ducer, but New York and Boston are nearest to the foreign
market.

Much is shipped to each of these cities for home

consumption, but the major part of all that they receive is
destined to a foreign market.

Some of it passes from Western

towns on through bills of lading to foreign ports, but the
most of it 'is consigned to the merchants of the Atlantic cities,
and is reshipped by them.

Except at Boston, it has been

found impracticable to distinguish between that intended for
home consumption and that for foreign shipment; and, there
fore, no discrimination in freight charges is attempted, but
all is charged as if destined to a foreign market.

But when

so treated, the Atlantic cities become merely so many points
on so many through routes between the interior of the country
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arid the European ports, arid the charges on shipments must

38

regard the whole lines and not parts of them merely. On

these several through lines, competing for the same business

between the same interior American towns and the foreign

ports, the whole charges, if the routes are equally favorable,

must be substantially the same, or the one giving the best

rates would obtain the business. The question of ocean rates

must, therefore, have an important bearing on the inland

rates ; for if the ocean rates are greater from Baltimore to

foreign ports than from New York to the same ports, the in-

land rates to Baltimore must necessarily be lower, or Balti-

more will be excluded from the trade. Turning our attention,

then, to the ocean freights, we find that during the year 1881,

from Baltimore to Liverpool by steam and sail, they averaged

nearly three cents per hundred pounds greater than from

New York, and from Philadelphia nearly two cents greater.

This is not conclusive of what they might be in another year,

but it is indicative of a general condition of things. Besides

this advantage in the ocean freights the New York route has

a further advantage in the somewhat greater expedition. If,

therefore, the railroads to Baltimore and Philadelphia were

to charge for the inland carriage the same that is charged to
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New York, they must do so with the certain result of losing

their present participation in the export trade. They must,

therefore, of necessity, make their average inland rates at least

as much lower than the inland rates to New York as will

offset the differences in the ocean freights. This follows

under the sway of competition from the same necessity

which forces upon two merchants trading side by side

in the same articles a concurrence in the same prices.

Attempts by agreement or otherwise to counteract this law of

competition would be of little avail, and of no avail whatever

for any great length of time. All the leading articles of east-

ern bound freight would be affected by this principle, and

this would be so large a proportion of the whole as to govern

the charges on all.

The differentials then appear to us to find their reason in

competitive forces. A brief reference to their history will

and the European ports, and the charges on shipments must
regard the whole lines and not parts of them merely.

On

these several through lines, competing for the same business
between the same interior American towns and the foreign
ports, the whole charges, if the routes are equally favorable,
must be substantially the same, or the one giving the best
rates would obtain the business.

The question of ocean rates

must, therefore, have an important bearing on the inland
rates ; for if the ocean rates are greater from Baltimore to
foreign ports than from New YOl'k to the same ports, the in
land 1·ates to Baltimore must necessarily be lower, or Balti
more will be excluded from the trade.

Turning our attention,

then, to the ocean freights, we find that during the year

1881,

from Baltimore to Liverpool by steam and sail, they averaged
nearly th1·ee cents per hundred pounds greater than from
New York, and from Philadelphia nearly two cents greater.
This is not conclusive of what they might be in another year,
but it is indicative of a general condition of things.

Besides

this advantage in the ocean freights the New York route has
a further advantage in the somewhat greater expedition.

If,

therefore, the 1·ailroads to Baltimore and Philadelphia were
to charge for the inland carriage the same that is charged to
New York, they must do so with the certain result of losing
their present participation in tb e export trade.

They must,

therefore, of necessity, make their average inland rates at least
as much lower than the inland rates to New York as will
offset the differences in the ocean freights.

This follows

under the sway of competition from the same necessity
which fo1·ces upon two

merchants

trading side by side

in the same articles a concurrence in the same prices.
Attempts by agreement or othe1·wise to counteract this law of
competiti on would be of little avail, and of no avail whatever
for any great length of time.

All the leading articles of east

ern bound freight would be .affected by this principle, and
this would be so large a proportion of the whole

as

to govern

the charges on all.
The differentials then appear to us to find their reason
competitive fOl'ces.

in

A brief i·eference to their history will
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show that compact has not succeeded in controlling them.

In 1869 there was an agreed difference in favor of Baltimore

in the rates for the transportation of grain, of ten cents per

hundred pounds. But the effort to sustain this difference led

to a war of rates, as a result of which it was reduced one

half. This lesser difference was maintained until 1876, when

an agreement was entered into by the Trunk Line roads which

based the rates on relative distances. But at the end of a

month and a half the New York roads withdrew from this

agreement, being satisfied that its operation was prejudicial

to their interests. Then followed another war of rates, end-

ing after a long struggle in the differentials now existing.

The war of rates of 1880 was entered into to get rid of them,

but it proved ineffectual, as before stated. They appear,

therefore, to abide the tests of competition, and they have

come, as prices generally do, under the exigencies of trade.

But it is, of course, possible that differentials may be just

at one time and . unjust at another ; and it is insisted on be-

half of New York that, whatever may have been the case

heretofore, the existing differentials are no longer just to that

city, and are no longer such as would result from a competi-

tion not hampered and restrained by railroad combinations.
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For evidence of the injustice, we are referred to statistics,

which show that the growth of Baltimore and Philadelphia

trade, especially in grain and provisions, has in late years

gained rapidly on that of New York. This, it is said, is proof

that the differentials operate against New York interests, and

the New York roads ought to abolish them by reducing their

own rates until they conform to the rates on the lines leading

to Baltimore and Philadelphia. This, it is insisted, is what

fair^competition requires.

It might, perhaps, be a sufficient answer to this demand,

thatJ the attempts heretofore made to force equality of

charges, though long persisted in, with no small loss to the

participants, proved unavailing. But passing that fact with-

out further remark, we direct our attention to the evidences

that New York has suffered from the differentials. These we

have not found of much weight. It is certainly true that

show that compact has not succeeded in controlling them.
In 1869 there was an agreed difference in favor of Baltimore
in the rates for the transportation of grain, of ten cents per
hundred pounds.

But the effort to sustain this diffe1·ence led

to a war of rates, as a result of which it was reduced one
half.

This lesser difference was maintained until 1876, when

an agreement was entered into by the Trunk Line roads which
based the rates on relative distances.

But at the end of a

month and a half the New York roads withdrew from this
agreement, being satisfied tha� its operation was prejudicial
to their interests.

Then followed another war of rates, end

ing after a long struggle in the differentials now existing.
The war of rates of 1880 was entered into to get rid of them,
but it proved ineflectual, as before stated.

They appear,

therefore, to abide the tests of competition, and they have
come, as prices generally do, under the exigencies of trade.
But it is, of course, possible that differentials may be just
at one time and . unjust at another ; and it is insisted on be
half of New York that, whatever may have been the case
heretofore, the existing differentials are no longer just to that
city, and are no longer such as would result from a competi
tfon not hampered and restrained by railroad combinations.
For evidence of the injustice, we are referred to statistics,
which show that the growth of Baltimore and Philadelphia
trade, especially in grain and provi�ions, has in late years
gained rapidly on that of New York.

This, it is said, is proof

that the differentials operate against New York interests, and
the New York roads ought to abolish them by reducing their
own rates until they conform to the rates on the lines leading
to Baltimore and Philadelphia.

This, it is insisted, is what

fai(competition requires.
It might, perhaps, be a sufficient answer to this demand,
that}the attempts

heretofore made to force

equality of

charges, though long persisted in, with no small loss to the
participants, proved unavailing.

But passing that faot with

out further remark, we direct our attention to the evidences
that New York has suffered from the differentials.
have not found of much weight.

These we

It is certainly true that
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Baltimore and Philadelphia have now a larger share in the

grain and provision traffic than they had fifteen years ago;

but it remains to connect the fact with the existence of the

differentials. For a long time New York nearly monopolized

that trade ; but the reasons were obvious in its better chan-

nels of communication with the interior, and its greater prep-

arations to accommodate it. When Baltimore and Philadel-

phia had extended their railroad systems, so as to compete

for the trade, and had provided elevators and other conve-

niences, they immediately took a share in the business; not

because of the differentials, but because they were then pre-

pared for it. But no evidences were produced before vis that

the Philadelphia and Baltimore business, to which the differ-

entials are applicable, is now increasing more rapidly in pro-

portion than that of New York, or that the growth of New York

business is to any extent checked by them. On the contrary,

there is abundant evidence that New York is fully maintaining

its present lead, and that its trade is enjoying a growth so

Baltimore and Philadelphia have now a larger share in the
grain and provision traffic than they had fifteen years ago ;
but it i·emains to connect the fact with the existence of the
differentials.

For a long time New York nearly monopolized

that trade; but the reasons were obvious in its better chan
nels of communication with the interior, and its greater prep
arations to accommodate it.

When Baltimore and Philadel

phia had extended their railroad systems, so as to compete
for the trade, and had provided elevators and other conve
niences, they immediately took a share in the business; not
because of the differentials, but because they were then pre

healthy and vigorous, that its commercial classes can well

afford to regard, without envy or regret, the prosperity of

other places, and may well concede to them, without repin-

ing, all the advantages which have come to them as a result
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of competitive efforts. The accompanjdng note will show the

relative proportion of the total receipts of grain and flour at

the four Atlantic ports which was received at each, and it

will appear from the figures, that New York, during the last

eighteen months, has gained on the others.* How far

ephemeral causes have contributed to this gain we cannot

know, but it is manifest that the evidence that New-York

suffers from the differentials does not yet appear.

As the interior is interested in the subject of differential

rates, and as the sharpest competition in freights is encoun-

*New York

1878. 56.

1879.

52.6

1880.

53.5

1881.

565

6 mo. 1883.

62.9

Boston

10.

10.6

11.7

14.3

16.8

pared for it.

But no evidences were produced before us that

the Philadelphia and Baltimore business, to which the differ
entials are applicable, is now increasing more rapidly in pro
portion than that of New York, or. that the growth of New York
business is to any extent checked by them.

On the contrary,

there is abundant evidence that New York is fully maintaining
its present lead, and that its trade is enjoying a growth so
healthy and vigorous, that its commercial classes can well
afford to regard, without envy or regret, the prosperity of
other places, and may well concede to them, without repin
ing, all the advantages which have come to them as a result
of competitive efforts.

The accompanying note will show the

relative proportion of the total receipts of grain and flour at
the four Atlantic ports. which was received at each, and it
will appear from the :figures, that New York, during the last
eighteen months, has

gained on the others.*

How far

ephemeral causes have contributed to this gain we cannot
know, but it is manifest that the evidence that New ·York
suffers from the differentials does not yet appear.
As the interior is interested in the subject of differential
rates, and as the sharpest competition in freights is en.conn-
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.

100.
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tered there, so that its commercial classes are in favorable

position to judge of the forces affecting them, it has seemed

to us no weak evidence of the justice and necessity of the

differentials that the preponderating sentiment in the interior

was strong and decided that the differentials were just.

There was, indeed, some dissent, but this was the prevailing

view.

In our discussion thus far, we have had but little to say of

the case of Boston, or of the westward bound freights. As to

the latter, some of the considerations above mentioned would

not apply, but the differences are not sufficient, as we think,

to relieve New York westward bound freights from the dif-

ferentials. We were not invited by the commercial organiza-

tions of Boston to visit that city, and we refrained for that

reason from doing so. We have reason to suppose that the

seeming want of interest in Boston in the subject referred to

us was due to the fact, that no one seemed .disposed to make

any controversy in respect to the rates to that city. Boston

claims the same rates with New York on the export trade,

and the other cities do not appear inclined to contest the

claim. This makes the charges less on foreign bound freights

than upon those delivered in Boston and other New England
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towns for home consumption; and to that extent works an

apparent injustice. If the low charges on foreign bound

goods have the;;e£fect to increase the charges on freights for

home consumption, it is an injustice in fact; but if not, and

the Boston roads consent to carry at the low rates as a neces-

sary condition to participation in the foreign trade, the other

cities cannot well contest their right to do so. As the ocean

freights from Boston correspond very closely to those from

New York, the principle already stated is applicable ; and we

have no occasion to consider the case of Boston separately.

X

^ CONCLUSION.

It only remains for us to state that no evidence has been

offered before us that the existing differentials are unjust, or

that they operate to the prejudice of either of. the Atlantic sea-

port cities. Differential rates have come into existence under

tered there, so that its commercial classes are in favorable
position to judge of the forces affe cting them, it has seemed
to us no weak evidence of the justice and necessity of the
differentials that the preponderating sentiment in the interior
was strong and decided that the differentials were just.
There was, indeed, some dissent, but this was the prevailing
VIeW.

In our discussion thus far, we have had but little to say of
the case of Boston, or of the westward bound freights.

As to

the latter, some of the considerations above mentioned would
not apply, but the differences are not sufficient, as we think,
to relieve New York westward bound freights from the dif
ferentials.

We were not invited by the commercial organiza

tions of Boston to visit that city, and we refrained for that
reason from doing so.

We have re ason to , suppose that the

seeming want of interest in Boston in the subject referred to
us was due to the fact, that no one seemed , disposed to make
any controversy in respect to the rates to .that city.

Boston

claims the same rates with New York on the export trade,
and the other cities do not appear inclined to contest the
claim.

This makes the charges less on foreign bound freights

than upon those delivered in Boston and ot4er New England
towns for home consumption ; and to that extent works an
apparent injustice.

If the low charges

on

foreign bound

goods have tiu,, , .�ffect to increase the charges . on freights for
home consumption, it is an injustice in fact ; but if not, and
the Boston roads consent to carry at the low rates as a neces
sary condition to participation in the foreign trade, the other
cities cannot well contest their right to do so.

As the ocean

freights from Boston correspond very closely to those from
New York, the principle already stated is applicable ; and we
have no occasion to consider the case of Boston separately.
-.\ .

CONCLUSI ON.

It only remains for us to state that no evid en ce has been
offered before us that the exi sti n g differentials

that they

operate to the prejudice

port cities.

are

unj ust, or

of either of. the A tlan tic sea

Differential rates have come into existence under
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the operation of competitive forces ; they bear some relation to
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relative distance and relative cost of service; they recognize as

we think the relative advantages of the several seaports; and

they are subordinate to the great principle which compels the

carriers of property competing between the same points and

offering equal facilities to their customers, to make the same

rates. We therefore cannot advise their being disturbed.

But we do not assume that the rates which are just to-day

will be just indefinitely. They have become established by the

force of circumstances, and they ought to give way if future

circumstances shall be such as to render it right and proper.

They constitute a temporary arrangement only; equitable, as

we think, for the present, but which may become inequitable

before the lapse of any considerable time. Whenever they shall

be found to operate unfairly, and to give a forced or unnatural

direction to trade, and whenever it shall appear that they tend

to deprive any one of the seaports affected by them of the pro-

portion of business that would naturally come to it under the

operation of normal competition, the want of equity in the rates

will appear, and it will be right to modify, or, perhaps, abolish

them.

Railroad problems assume such different phases from year to
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year, and almost from day to day, that those who have authority

in railroad matters may justly be expected and required to give

their earnest attention and best efforts to making their franchises

accomplish the great ends of equal, fair, prompt and beneficial

accommodation which was intended in their grant. And those

ends they should have in view in determining upon the con-

tinued existence of differential rates. Their observation of the

general course of traffic from day to day and from month to

month ought to enable them to determine whether the differen-

tials are too large or too small; whether they are influencing

trade unfairly and unnaturally; and whether they operate as an

improper restraint upon competition; and when the improper

effect is discovered, they ought to correct the wrong without

hesitation or delay. To enable them to judge fairly and with

full understanding, accurate statistics of their business should

be kept by each of them, and submitted to the others or kept in

the operati on of comp e titi ve forces ; they bear some relation to
rel ative distance and relative cost of service ; th ey recognize ·

as

we think the relative ad va ntages of the several seaports ; an d
they are subord in ate to the great pri nc iple which compels the
carriers of pro perty compe ti ng between the same poi nts an d
offeri ng equal facilities to th ei r custo mers, to make the same
rates.

We therefore cannot advise their being disturbed.

But we do not assume that the rates which are j ust to-day
will be j u st in defini tely.

They have become e stablished by the

force of c ircumstances, and they ought to gi ve way if future
circumstances shall be such as to render i t righ t an d p roper.

They constitute a temporary arrangement only ; equi table ,

as

we think, for the present, but wh ich may become inequitable
before the lapse of any consi derable time .

W he neve r th ey shall

be fou nd to operate unfairly, an d to give a forced or u nn atu ral
direction to trade, and whenever it shall appear that they ten d
to depri ve any one of the seaports affected by them of the pro
portion of business that would naturally come to it under the
o peration of normal co m p etition, the want of equity in the rates
wi l l appear, and it will be ri ght to modify, or, perhap s, abolish
th em .

Railroad probl e ms assume such different ph ases from year to
year, and almost from day to day, that those who have authority

in railroad m atters may j u s tly be expected and requ ired to give
their earnest attention and best efforts to making their franchises

accom plish the great ends of equal, fair, prompt and beneficial
accommodation which was intended i n their grant.

And those

ends they shou ld have in view in determi ning upon th e con
tinued existence of differential rates .

Their observation of the

general course of traffic from day to day and from month to
month ought to en able them to determ in e whether the differen
tials are too large or too small ; whether they are influenci ng
trade unfai rly an d unnaturally ; and whether they operate as an
i m proper restraint upon competition ; and w hen the im proper

effect is discovered, they ought to correct the wrong without
hesitation or d elay.

To enable the m to j udge fairly and with

full understandi ng, accurate statistics of their business should
be kept by each of them, and submitted to the othe rs or kept in
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some common office ; and these statistics ought to be periodically

given to the public also. Publicity is a great corrector of

imaginary evils, and may be an important preventive of evils,

both imaginary and real.

We do not assume or believe that there exists in railroad

official circles any legitimate authority to determine the ques-

tion of rates arbitrarily. Large powers of self government have,

undoubtedly, been left by the law in railroad managers, but all

their authority is qualified by duty to the public; and it cannot

be too often or too pointedly asserted that the obligation on

their part to serve the public with relative fairness is of perpet-

ual force. In their future dealings with the important question

which has been the occasion for our coming together, the great

Trunk Lines should be particularly careful to give no occasion

for just complaint, that they subject any one of the seaboard

cities to the operation of arbitrary or unfair regulations or

charges, or that they fail to observe towards any one of them,

or towards the people trading or desiring to trade with them,

the mandate of the common law—to deal justly and distribute

fairly the benefits and burdens which are incident to their occu-

pation.

ALLEN G. THUEMAN,
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E. B. WASHBUENE,

THOMAS M. COOLEY.

NEW YOBK, July 20, 1882.

some common office ; and these statistics ought to be periodically
given to the p ubl ic also. P ublici ty is a great corrector of
imaginary evils, and may be an im portan t preventive of evils,
both imaginary and real.
We do not assume or believe that there exists in rai l r oad
official circles any legitimate authority to de ter mi n e the ques
tion of rates arbitrarily. Large powers of self governmen t have,
und oubtedly, been left by the Jaw in rail road managers, but all
their au th ority is qualified by duty to the pub lic ; and it can not
be too often or too pointedly asserted that the obligation o n
their part to serve the public with relative fairness is of perpet
ual force.
In thei r future dea l i n gs with the important qu esti o n
which has been the occasion for our coming together, the great
Trunk Lines should be p art icu l arly careful to give no occasion
for j ust complai n t, that they s u bject any one of the seaboard
cities to the operation of arbitrary or unfair reg u lations o r
charges , or that they fail to ob se rve towards any one of th em ,
or towards the peopl e tradi ng or desiring to trade with them,
the mandate of the comm on law-to dea l j ustly and distribu te
fairly the benefits and burdens which are incident to their occu 
p ati on .
ALLEN G. THURMAN,
E. B. WASHBURNE,
THOMAS M. COOLEY.
NEW YORK, .Tidy 20, 1882.

